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NOTE

MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL V. TAXPAYERS
FOR VINCENT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF PROHIBITING TEMPORARY SIGN
POSTING ON PUBLIC PROPERTY TO
ADVANCE LOCAL AESTHETIC CONCERNS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' When the right to freedom of speech
and governmental regulatory interests collide, however, the speech may be
restricted or confined.' In Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (only free debate and exchange of ideas ensure government's
responsiveness to the people).
2. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (rejecting argument that the first
amendment must be read literally and accepting view that the first amendment does not prohibit regulations which inordinately limit speech); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(upholding a ban on political speeches on a military base); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (upholding city ban on "loud and raucous" sound trucks); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941) (a state may reasonably restrict the time, place, and manner of demonstrations on public streets).
The court's conclusion that local governments may regulate expression at all reflects a
"marketplace of ideas" concept of the first amendment's freedom of speech guarantee. Free
speech is thus protected as long as the government does not prevent the speaker from introducing his or her beliefs into the "marketplace of ideas." See Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness:
Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 937
(1983). Baker suggests that this approach merely ensures that "everything worth saying shall
be said," but does not protect the total sum of expressive possibilities. He notes that an
"individual autonomy" or "self-realization" interpretation would not support governmental
substitution of a convenient forum of speech for that which the speakers themselves choose.
Id. at 945-46. Baker suggests that three predominant tendencies of modern courts have resulted
in the overregulation of public places at the expense of free expression. First, courts have a
tendency to view the first amendment not as a limitation on governmental authority, but as
a guarantee of an individual right to speak. Id. at 939-40. Second, courts bear prejudice toward
the notion of current middle class ideology being the appropriate balance between regulation
and speech. This essentially would favor the "status quo" and give very little protection to
dissenters. Id. at 944. Third, courts favor the "marketplace of ideas" theory of first amendment speech guarantees, without recognizing the possibility that a marketplace of ideas can
consist exclusively of the ideas of persons most able to effectively participate in that marketplace.
Id. at 944-45; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (open discussion will protect
against political untruth).

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:197

Vincent,3 the Supreme Court approved 4 a municipality's absolute and permanent ban on the posting of temporary signs on public property.' The C6urt
reasoned that aesthetic values, just recently recognized as sufficient to support any restriction on speech, 6 were sufficient to satisfy the complete prohibition of a particular mode of communication. 7 The Vincent Court deferentially evaluated the governmental interest, giving little weight to the plaintiff's political speech interests, because the regulation did not affect a traditional public forum.' The Court's treatment of the competing interests marks
a turning point in first amendment analysis. By broadly authorizing aesthetic
regulations and narrowly limiting the scope of a highly protected public
forum, the Court has delegated new authority to cities to prohibit offensive
or troublesome methods of communication.
This Note begins by reviewing the Supreme Court's methods for analyzing restrictions on communication generally, and will focus particularly on
the public forum concept and the traditionally high level of protection that
the Court extends to political speech. The Vincent decision is then discussed
in light of this background. This Note concludes by suggesting that the Court
ignored the constitutional significance of political speech and inverted wellrecognized priorities by valuing aesthetic interests above freedom of speech.

II. BACKGROUND
Where first amendment protections of speech begin and end is unclear;
Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars have heatedly debated the contours of the first amendment. ' Of course, not all speech is protected by

3. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
4. Id.at 2135-36.
5. Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits posting of any handbill or sign:
IT]o or upon any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, curbstone, street lamp post, hydrant,
tree, shrub, tree stake or guard, railroad trestle, electric light or power or telephone
or telegraph or trolley wire pole, or wire appurtenance thereof or upon any fixture
of the fire alarm or police telegraph system or upon any lighting system, public
bridge, drinking fountain, life buoy, life preserver, life boat or other life saving
equipment, street sign or traffic sign.
104 S. Ct. at 2122.
6. See Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (approving San Diego's aesthetic interest in banning commercial billboards). Compare Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinance dispersing adult theatres
because closely-grouped theatres would tend to have detrimental effects on community) with
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (refusing to uphold absolute prohibition of live entertainment to avoid essentially aesthetic problems).
7. 104 S. Ct. at 2135-36.
8. Id. at 2134. For an authoritative definition of a public forum, see Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (describing the levels of scrutiny
the court will use to review regulations of speech on the various types of public property).
9. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (majority adopted a balancing
approach recognizing that speech may be restricted to favor a "subordinating" governmental
interest). Justice Harlan delivered the majority opinion in Konigsberg, specifically rejecting the
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the first amendment. For example, the Court has refused to extend constitutional protection to obscenity,"0 child pornography," libel, 2 and "fighting
words" which directly elicit a violent response. 3 Additionally, commercial4
speech receives a lesser level of protection than non-commercial speech.'

Wherever the extreme perimeters of protected speech may lie, it is clear that,
at a minimum, the first amendment protects political speech. 5
"absolutist" approach of Justice Black. Id. at 49-50. As does Justice Black, Alexander Meiklejohn, a noted advocate of free speech, views the first amendment as an absolute-a specific
reservation of sovereign power by the people to themselves. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 253-54. Meiklejohn proposed that the first amendment necessarily must protect all communication that insures that the people will acquire and
maintain the experience and knowledge to effectively govern themselves. According to Meiklejohn, protected speech therefore includes, among other things, education and any speech promoting an understanding of philosophy, the sciences, literature, the arts, and public issues.
Id. at 256-57.
For other theories regarding first amendment protection, see Baker, supra note 2, at 939-40
(advocating a view that the first amendment constitutes not an individual right, but a limit
on governmental authority); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (proposing protection of only political speech); Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) (arguing for "definitional balancing").
For a general discussion of the first amendment, see BeVier, The FirstAmendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of the Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1978) (overview of the scope of first amendment protections); DuVal, Free Communication
of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment
Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1972) (general discussion of approaches to first
amendment protections).
10. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (rejecting the argument
that states must allow commerce in obscene materials as an extension of individual privacy
interests); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing a three-part test for identification of unprotected obscenity).
11. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
12. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libelous speech is
unprotected if made in regard to a public official by one who knows it is false or who speaks
with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity). In a consolidated case decided three years after
New York Times, the New York Times standard was extended to libelous speech made in regard
to all "public figures." See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); see also Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (establishing that libelous statements are unprotected
under the first amendment even when made only negligently if the object of the defamation
is a private individual).
13. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
14. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Also, the Court may in effect recognize a lower level of protection for sexually explicit, though
not obscene, material. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC
ruling declaring its own authority to impose formal sanctions against broadcast company which
aired comedian's "Filthy Words" monologue in mid-afternoon); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding Detroit ordinance requiring that theatres displaying "adult movies" be located at least 1,000 feet apart). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CO NSTITTIONAL LAW 1243-58 (10th ed. 1980) (suggesting that sexually explicit
speech falls within the lower level of a "two-tiered" approach to first amendment protections).
15. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (discussion of public issues "has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values"); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it
is the essence of self-government"); see also Stephan, The First Amendment and Content
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Although political speech is not free from governmental restriction, 6 the
Supreme Court recognizes political speech as among the most highly protected forms of speech," particularly when directly related to a political
campaign.' 8 The Court has stated that the most stringent scrutiny is necessary
when reviewing restrictions affecting political speech. The Court's own use
of heightened scrutiny,2" however, has not been consistent. It apparently
depends on factors other than the political nature of the speech. When the
issue is voting or access to the ballot, for example, the Court readily rejects

Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207 (1982) ("Perhaps the leading theme in the Supreme

Court's cases is the primacy of political speech."). Stephan noted that Meiklejohn's theory
that political speech must be completely open to support a representative democracy is so well
accepted that the only remaining issue for debate is whether only political speech should be
protected. Id. at 208.
16. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) ("That speech is used as a
tool for political ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution"). Initially, the Court recognized state authority to prohibit and punish speech that
created a "clear and present danger" of a resultant "substantive evil," such as an attempted
obstruction of the draft. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Court later
adopted a more stringent test requiring that the speaker advocate subversive policy, not merely
express ideas, before the government could prohibit or punish his speech. See Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (reversing convictions under the Smith Act because the law allowed
punishment without requiring that the speaker had advocated action). In the latest stage of
refinement in the scope of protected political speech, all speech is protected except that constituting an incitement to imminent lawless action which is also likely to result in that action.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
17. See cases cited supra note 15.
18. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982). The Brown Court rejected Kentucky's application of a statute designed to prohibit solicitation for the sale of votes to a candidate who
had promised to reduce costs to taxpayers by cutting his own salary if elected. Id. at 56-57.
The Court stated that "[t]he free exchange of ideas provides special vitality to the process
traditionally at the heart of American constitutional democracy-the political campaign." Id.
at 53; accord Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (first amendment "has
its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office").
19. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (majority applied strict scrutiny
to invalidate a criminal law aimed at preventing corporations from spending money to influence
public opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976) (noting that "exacting scrutiny"
must be applied to government limitations "on core first amendment rights of political
expression").
20. One of the first and most famous statements advocating "heightened scrutiny" to protect individual rights was made by Chief Justice Stone in 1938:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Court has frequently
employed "heightened scrutiny" to strike down legislation despite the existence of a rational
relation between the legislation and a "legitimate" state interest when the Court finds that
the legislation infringes upon a paramount constitutional right. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (a pregnant woman's privacy interest is paramount to the state's interests in
her health and the life of her unborn child until those interests become "compelling" at the
end of the first and second trimesters, respectively).
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burdensome restrictions. 2' Conversely, if the Court finds the location at issue
to be inappropriate for political speech, it uses a lesser level of review.22
Thus, when a restriction abridges political speech, the appropriate level of
review is uncertain. If the abridged speech is not political, the appropriate
level of protection is even more uncertain. 23 The resultant case law is a confusing array of overlapping tests and doctrines, all of which culminate in
the balancing of competing interests.24 The following background is, therefore,
necessarily a generalized analysis of the Supreme Court's approach to first

amendment restrictions.
A.

Analytical Tools for Review of First Amendment Restrictions

Generally, a court that reviews an ordinance or statute abridging speech
will make an initial analysis in the following manner. If the law prohibits
only a category of speech unprotected by the first amendment, the law will
stand because there has been no constitutionally-relevant abridgement of free

speech. 2" If the regulation as written is wholly contradictory to the freedom
of speech guarantee, the court will strike it down as unconstitutional "on
its face." 26 For example, the court will strike down a regulation for vagueness
21. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (1983). The Anderson Court struck
down Ohio's law requiring an early filing date for independent presidential candidates because
it "heavily burdened" the independent voters' rights to associate freely in their support of
a candidate. Id. at 1569. The Court concluded that the voters' rights "unquestionably" outweighed
the minimal state interests. Id. at 1579; see also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking down restrictions allowing only real estate owners and parents
of enrolled children to vote in local school district election); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down the imposition of a fee to obtain a ballot). But
see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding
restriction allowing only landowners to vote on a proposal for supplying farmers with water
and apportioning the cost among the recipients).
22. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion)
(plurality upheld city's refusal to allow political advertising on its transit vehicles, noting that
the vehicles were not among "traditional settings" for political speech).
23. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC's decision to
consider administrative sanctions against Pacifica for broadcasting a non-obscene comic
monologue); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding ordinance
requiring adult theatres to be placed 1,000 feet apart). See generally Stephan, supra note 15,
at 209 ("[o]utside the area of political speech ...the Court's decisions reflect confusion of
purpose and uncertainty about the meaning of 'full' first amendment protection").
24. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 9, at 299. Professor BeVier noted that "abundant first
amendment literature has failed to dispel the climate of uncertainty and intellectual disorder
that permeates the concept and implementation of freedom of speech." Id.
25. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Chaplinsky Court
concluded that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from punishing "fighting words"
or speech which is "lewd and obscene." Id. at 571-72.
26. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The Lovell Court found an ordinance
requiring a license to distribute religious pamphlets invalid on its face. The Court stated that
the regulation struck "at the very foundation of the freedom of the press." Id. at 451. For
Justice Stone's now famous statement that legislation which directly encroaches upon the domain
of one of the first ten amendments must fall within a "narrower scope" to receive the Court's
"presumption of constitutionality," see United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152
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if the wording of the law is unclear and leaves speakers uncertain as to
whether their speech will fall within the rule's prohibition.27 The uncertainty
resulting from such a vague rule may cause would-be speakers to remain
silent rather than risk punishment. Thus, the exercise of their free speech

rights is "chilled." 2
Reviewing courts will also strike down a regulation that chills speech if
the regulation is overbroad,2 9 that is, if it reaches speech that is protected
by the first amendment as well as unprotected speech.3 0 A statute, although
properly aimed at speech not protected by the first amendment, may be
drafted too broadly for its legitimate targets, and thus may restrict protected
speech as well." Even a speaker whose speech is in a category not protected
by the first amendment may challenge an overbroad ordinance. 32 The over-

breadth rule is therefore an exception to general standing requirements-it
n.4 (1938). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press").
27. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (striking down as vague two state
requirements that state employees swear they are unaffiliated with any "subversive organization"); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (striking down as vague
requirement that public employees declare they had no affiliation with the Communist Party).
Vague laws are unconstitutional because they do not give adequate notice of what conduct
is impermissible. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951) (establishing that a
statute or ordinance must provide a "definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practices"). Similarly, vague laws allow law enforcement officials
an inordinate amount of discretion in making arrests. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance held unconstitutionally vague because it afforded no fair
notice and allowed arbitrary enforcement). See generally Shaman, The First Amendment Rule
Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 259, 262-65 (1979) (distinguishing the unconstitutionally
vague from the unconstitutionally overbroad law).
28. See generally Shaman, supra note 27, at 259-60 (1979) (discussion of the chilling effect
on speech caused by a vague or overbroad law which deters protected speech).
29. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Ferber Court stated with
regard to the chilling effect in the overbreadth context: "It is for this reason that we have
allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making
the attack is clearly unprotected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the requisite
specificity." Id. at 769. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970) (comprehensive discussion of the overbreadth doctrine).
30. The overbreadth rule allows a court to strike down a statute that, while designed to
prohibit activities not protected by the Constitution, also prohibits activities which are constitutionally protected. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 868 (2d ed. 1983). See generally Shaman, supra note 27. Professor Shaman notes that
overbroad regulations are facially unconstitutional, and that the overbreadth doctrine is an
exception to two general rules of constitutional law: I) courts normally construe statutes so
as to save their constitutionality, and 2) courts generally only review a statute with regard to
its application to the complaining party. Id. at 260-61.
31. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (holding that governmental regulations may not sweep unnecessarily into the realm of constitutionally protected rights).
32. See, e.g.,
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The Schad Court
stated that "[blecause appellants' claims are rooted in the First Amendment, they are entitled
to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the expressive activities of others as well as their
own." Id. at 66; see also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
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allows the challenger to assert the rights of unnamed third parties." The
court will review the effects that the challenged ordinance has on these third
parties, and, if the ordinance results in an unconstitutional restriction of
the third parties' protected speech, the court will strike down the entire
34

ordinance as overbroad.

In recent years the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the overbreadth doctrine." Only when a reviewing court determines that a statute
or ordinance is substantially overbroad may the court strike it down under
the doctrine.36 The substantiality of the statute's overbreadth is determined
by comparing the instances of the legitimate and illegitimate applications
of the statute.37 Presumably, only a statute or ordinance which reaches a
proportionately high level of protected speech is overbroad under the current application of the rule.38 It is not clear, however, whether the proportionality comparison is a quantitative test. The Court has left open the
(1980). The Schaumburg Court struck down an ordinance that allowed solicitation of funds
only by charitable organizations who devoted at least 75% of their collections to their ultimate
charitable goals. The Court found the ordinance to be overly broad because some charitable
organizations (unlike the challenging group) whose primary goal was to accumulate and
disseminate information regarding public opinion could not meet the "75% test," and yet were
involved in speech protected by the first amendment. See also U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967) (invalidating statute requiring disclosure of all associations with Communist groups because
it allowed no consideration of degree of association).
33. The overbreadth rule is an exception to the general principle that an individual to whom
a statute may properly be applied cannot challenge it because it may be applied unconstitutionally to others. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940) (both cases noting validity of challenges to rules which prohibit activities
protected by the first amendment whether or not the challengers' speech is protected); see also
U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (stating general rule that one does not have standing to
challenge a rule because it limits the exercise of another's constitutional rights). See generally
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (thorough discussion of the reasons for, and
proper extent of, the standing requirement exception); Redish, The Warren Court, The Burger
Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031 (1983) (analysis
of Supreme Court's changing approach to overbreadth challenges) [hereinafter cited as Overbreadth Doctrine].
34. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (striking rule prohibiting members
of Communist organizations from any employment in defense plants).
35. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The Broadrick Court rejected an
overbreadth challenge to Oklahoma's limitation on permissible political activity by civil servants. The majority concluded that: "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well ..
"
Id. at 615; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Ferber Court concluded
that New York's statute prohibiting the sale of any material depicting a child engaged in sexual
activity was not unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court determined that "the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of the regulation." Id. at 772. The FerberCourt extended the substantiality requirement from cases involving conduct combined with speech to traditional forms of speech-books and films. Id. at 771.
36. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
37. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982). The FerberCourt concluded that improper
application of New York's prohibition of material depicting children involved in sexual conduct probably amounted to no more than a "tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's
reach." Id.
38. See generally Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 33, at 1065-67 (analysis of the Ferber
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possibility that either the particularly offensive nature of the target speech
or the extraordinary value of the protected speech may tip the balance of
the substantiality test.3 9
A related issue in the review of speech-restrictive regulations is whether
the legislature or regulating body should have used less restrictive means
to achieve its end."' The "least restrictive means" analysis may often be
employed in cases raising freedom of speech issues even when no overbreadth
challenge is made. 4 ' Frequently, however, the reviewing court combines the
issues, making no clear distinction between them. 2
If the court dismisses these initial challenges, it must still adjudicate the
individual's own first amendment claim by balancing the first amendment
free speech interests against the regulatory interests of the state or
municipality. In striking this balance, the court will consider the setting which
the challenged restriction affects; regulations in a traditional public forum
are less favored than regulations in a more restricted setting.4 3 In addition,
the court will determine whether the regulation impermissibly discriminates
against particular speech because of its content or because of the speaker's
Court's interpretation of the substantial overbreadth requirement, noting that the language
indicates a numerical test, but concluding that the Court, in fact, uses a balancing approach).
39. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982), the Court stated that the New York
statute's "legitimate reach dwarf[ed] its arguably impermissible applications." This phrase can
be interpreted as a qualitative rather than a quantitative test. Then the importance of preventing instances of child pornography greatly outweighs, if the instances do not outnumber,
the chilling effect of improper applications of the statute. The Court also expressed doubt regarding the very existence of circumstances which might legitimately require the use of children
involved in sexual conduct, id., and noted that the value of using children in this manner
was "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis," id. at 762. Read together, this may mean that
either the heinous nature of the target speech or the unimportance of the protected, but prohibited, speech can tip the substantiality balance.
40. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (invalidating law that prohibited all
Communist organization members from working in defense plants); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating law making members in Communist Party ineligible
to teach school in New York); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating rule that
teachers disclose all organization memberships). Compare Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note
33, at 1035-36 (less drastic means analysis is "the focus of the overbreadth doctrine") with
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 30, at 873 (treating overbreadth and less
drastic means as distinct analyses).
41. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring teachers to name
all organization memberships invalid because state's interest in ensuring teacher fitness and
competency could be served by more narrow means).
42. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
(Court discussed both less restrictive alternatives and third party interests as it invalidated
ordinance limiting authority to solicit to charitable organizations that donate 75% of receipts
to charitable end); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (ban on defense facility employment of Communist party member swept too broadly; legislature's goal achievable by less drastic
means); see also Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 33, at 1051-52 (discussion of the risks a
court assumes when it declares that a legislature has not used the least restrictive means, but
does not state what narrower means are available).
43. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (describing the heightened level of scrutiny applicable to a regulation restricting speech in a public forum).
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viewpoint." The reviewing court also will determine the governmental
interests, how important the enforcement of the regulation is to those
interests,"' and how significantly the regulation impacts on a speaker's ability
to communicate his message. 6 These balancing factors are treated
independently below, because each is capable of swaying a reviewing court's
decision.
B.

The Right to Speak in Public Places

The first amendment prohibits the government from infringing upon the
people's right to free speech.4 7 The most logical location for effective speech
is in public places. Yet, the first amendment, as initially interpreted, did
not establish any right of access to public property for use as a forum for
speech. 8 In fact, in an early case the Supreme Court emphatically rejected
the suggested right of access. 9 The Court equated the state's position to
that of a private property owner, with as much authority to prohibit even
communicative activity on state property."
Forty years later, however, a plurality of the Court strongly supported
a public right of access to streets and parks in Hague v. C.I.O.5 1 The Hague
44. The Supreme Court has held that "above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983) (striking down prohibition
on displaying signs and distributing literature in front of the Supreme Court building because
the regulation was not logically necessary to maintain security); Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding regulation prohibiting distribution
of literature except from assigned booths at a state fair because the regulation was important
to the maintenance of order at the crowded, temporary fair).
46. The Supreme Court is less likely to uphold a speech restrictive regulation if there are
not sufficient alternative avenues of communication available. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (striking down ban on live entertainment in a borough when
the borough failed to demonstrate that adequate alternatives existed).
47. The first amendment provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is extended to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. For cases applying the first amendment to the states,
see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
48. See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1; Stone, ForaAmericana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233; Note,
The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 117 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Minimum Access].
49. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The Davis Court unanimously concluded
that the Constitution created no such individual right of access to public property. The decision affirmed the famous opinion of Justice Holmes: "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it
in his house." Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895).
50. The Court approved the Massachusett's Supreme Court ruling. See Davis v. Massachusettes, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
51. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Justice Roberts stated:
wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
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plurality, faced with a city ordinance banning public assemblies without a
permit, stated that "streets and parks . . . have immemorially been held

in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for . . . discussing public questions." 52 The plurality recognized that while

a citizen's right of access to the streets and parks is not absolute, it must
not be abridged or denied in the guise of regulation."3 The regulations that
the Court has most consistently rejected as unacceptable are content-based
regulations which abridge access for speech purposes.
1. Content-based Regulations
Local governments may validly regulate the time, place, and manner of

speech in public places," but cannot censor the content of that speech. 5
The Supreme Court's prohibition of official censorship also encompasses those
regulations which delegate broad administrative discretion for interpretation
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen
of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative,
and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience,
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id.at 515-16.
52. Id. See generally Stone, supra note 48, at 237-38. Stone notes that Justice Roberts,
while rejecting the government's authority to prohibit speech, started from the same point Justice
Holmes did-consideration of property rights and interests. Id.
53. 307 U.S. at 516.
54. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Cox is a leading first amendment case
establishing the acceptability of time, place, and manner regulations. The Cox Court upheld
New Hampshire's licensing requirement for parades and outdoor meetings. The Court noted
that the New Hampshire Supreme Court had limited the rule to grant authority to restrict
only the time, place, or manner of the speech to avoid public disturbance or inconvenience.
The New Hampshire court allowed officials no authority to refuse a license based on the content of the speech and no arbitrary power since officials were required to treat applicants
uniformly.
55. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (striking down
ordinance limiting billboard advertisements to those locations where advertised product or service available, because no similar exception was allowed for non-commercial speech); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (striking down commission's ban on only those bill enclosure statements which expressed opinions regarding controversial subjects); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (striking down
ordinance prohibiting display of movies containing nudity at drive-in theatres as discrimination
based on context); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1910) (striking down ban on residential picketing which exempted persons involved in labor disputes).
There are some notable exceptions to the rule that speech cannot be regulated because of
its content. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(upholding public school district's policy denying access to teachers' mail boxes to one union
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and enforcement. 6 The stated purpose of the Court is to prevent regulation
of speech due to its content- regardless of whether that discrimination is
blatant57 or covert." The Court thus rejects content discrimination whether
it occurs in the regulation's creation59 or in its enforcement." °
Describing the court's rejection of official censorship as a prohibition of
content discrimination is common, but perhaps misleading. The cases show
a firm disapproval of regulations which discriminate between speakers because
of their viewpoints.' For example, the Court will not support a regulation
that permits the speech of a person advocating one side of a public issue,
but which prohibits the speech of one taking the opposing viewpoint. 6 2 At
while permitting access to another union and other outside organizations); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the keeping of customer complaints to radio station's
broadcast of comedian's "indecent" monologue in FCC licensing file); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding ordinance requiring adult
theatres to be located at least 500 feet apart from one another); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding city's ban on political advertising while permitting
all other advertisements on placard space in public transit vehicles).
For a general discussion of content discrimination and the first amendment, see Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (discussion
of Court's treatment of content of speech) [hereinafter cited as Content Distinction]; Stephan,
supra note 15 (describing the Court's failure to adhere to a broad content-neutrality rule).
56. See Procunier v. Martines, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (striking down regulation that allowed
prison officials to censor mail without providing clear standards); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948) (striking down New York ordinance giving police broad authority to refuse licenses
to speakers using sound trucks); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing the
conviction of a Jehovah's witness under a loosely-worded breach of the peace statute). But
see Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (conviction for meeting without a license
upheld because speaker did not seek judicial review when application for license denied).
57. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The Stromberg Court invalidated
a statute prohibiting the display of any symbol demonstrating opposition to the government.
The Court noted that the statute "as authoritatively construed is so vague and indefinite as
to permit the punishment [of free political discussion]." Id. at 369.
58. For cases requiring careful judicial scrutiny of regulations to ensure that no covert contentbased restrictions exist, see Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
59. See, e.g., Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2125 n.14 (suggesting that the purpose of the ordinance
in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1981), was to suppress ideas).
60. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 10 U.S. 296 (1940) (Court suggested that officials
had enforced the breach of the peace statute to prevent the speaker's communication because
they disliked his ideas); see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing
breach of peace convictions of "peaceful" demonstrators); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951) (reversing conviction under arbitrarily enforced ordinance prohibiting religious discussion without permit).
61. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S.
Ct. 1365 (1983) (striking down Minnesota's differential use tax which fell on only II of 388
newspapers in the state); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (striking down statute
prohibiting religious meetings in public parks but permitting "church services"); Grosjean v.
American Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down tax that applied to only 13 of 163 newspapers
in Louisiana).
62. See generally Stephan, supra note 15. Stephan argues that while the Court firmly rejects
state discrimination against particular viewpoints, it has not adhered firmly to any broader
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every level of public speech analysis, the Court gives the greatest protection
to individuals whose speech is restricted not because of the way or the place
3
in which they wish to speak, but merely because of what they wish to say.
Nevertheless, while advocating complete content-neutrality, the Court has
frequently approved regulations which treat different types of speech, with
inherently diverse contents, differently." Furthermore, the Court has concluded that, in some circumstances, one speaker may be treated differently
from all others.6" For example, in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee66 the Court concluded that Ohio's otherwise valid law
requiring political candidates to disclose the names and addresses of campaign contributors and the recipients of campaign funds could not be applied
constitutionally to the Socialist Workers Party. 7 The Court noted the contributors' and recipients' particular vulnerability to harassment due to the
party's dissident political beliefs and concluded that only a "compelling"
state interest, to which the disclosure requirement was substantially related,68
would support the application of the rule to the contributors and recipients.
Although such constitutionally compelled exemptions 9 are rare, they
demonstrate that the Court's advocacy of content-neutrality is less than
absolute.
The Court's espoused prohibition of content-based regulations is based
both on equal protection grounds7" and on a first amendment grant of equal
content-neutrality rule. Id. at 214-15. Stephan analyzes the Court's numerous decisions advocating content-neutrality and concludes that the decisions establish not one, but five possible
approaches to the prevention of discrimination in regulating speech. Id. at 218-31.
63. For example, the Court concluded in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983), that a state must demonstrate that its content-based regulation of speech
in a traditional public forum is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest," while contentneutral regulations in the same forum need only be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
. . . interest." Id. at 45. On public property that is not a public forum, the state may regulate
speech in a reasonable manner "as long as the regulation . .. [is] not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46.
64. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (approving lesser protection
for sexually explicit radio broadcast); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (approving requirement that adult movie theatres be placed 1,000 feet apart); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (approving city's exclusion of poliltical advertising on its car card space).
65. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (exempting the NAACP
from disclosure requirements); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (invalidating state
court order requiring NAACP to present its membership lists to determine whether the organization had violated a statute requiring registration before conducting business in the state).
66. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
67. Id. at 101-02.
68. Id. at 92-93.
69. See Stone & Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the
First Amendment, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 583. Professors Stone and Marshall concluded that the
Court's rationale in Brown could best be explained by viewing the "constitutionally compelled
exemption" as based on the Court's independent interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 602-04.
The Court thus permits itself discretion that would be improper if delegated to the legislature.
Id. at 602. The decision can further be explained as based on the Court's desire to provide
a form of "affirmative action" to an unpopular political party. Id. at 604-06.
70. See Kalven, supra note 48, at 29-30; see also Stone, supra note 48, at 272-80 (discussion
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access to an open forum. 7 ' The more difficult question, however, is whether
the first amendment embraces an absolute minimum right of access to public
property that prohibits the government from banning all speech, notwithstanding the fact that the government's ban applies without regard to content,
viewpoint, or the speaker's identity.
2.

Content-neutral Regulations

Content-neutral restrictions on speech ordinarily are not designed to censor the ideas of a speaker, but they effectively reduce the number of communicative methods available. 72 To be valid, content-neutral regulations must

afford the speaker the opportunity to reach his willing audience.73 When
such regulations restrict speech in a public area, the only permissible regulations are those which restrict the time, place, or manner of speech."' When
content-neutral regulations that restrict speech are challenged, the Court enters
into a balancing process, weighing the asserted governmental interests against

the restriction of speech.7 In this process, speech interests are given a pre-

of the equal protection analysis of regulations on public speech).

71. See generally Blumoff, After Metromedia: Sign Controls and the First Amendment,
28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 171, 180-83 (1984); Note, Minimum Access, supra note 48, at 141 n.157
(suggests distinction between the equal protection and content censorship issues "approaches
the metaphysical").
72. This is the "equal access" branch of public speech analysis. For a thorough discussion
of the "equal access" requirement, see Content Distinction, supra note 55, at 114-18. See also
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The Kovacs Court upheld a prohibition of "loud and
raucous" soundtrucks, noting that it is unimportant whether the restriction is considered a
regulation of speech or a prohibition of a certain form of speech as long as there is no "real
abridgement of the rights of free speech." Id. at 85. The Kovacs Court stated that the speaker's
first amendment rights are adequately protected if he is given the "opportunity to win the
attention of willing listeners." Id. at 87. He need not be afforded the method of speech that
reaches the largest audience. Id. at 88-89. The Kovacs Court did not consider this a ban on
all sound trucks, but a ban only on "loud and raucous" sound trucks which the city reasonably
considered to be a nuisance. Id. at 85; cf. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1967) (first amendment's purpose is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas").
73. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). There have also been a number of decisions
espousing a corollary right of the public to freely receive information. See, e.g., Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down state disciplinary rule against lawyers' price advertising); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (striking down prohibition on
"for sale" signs in front of homes); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (citizens' right to know necessitated striking ban on price
advertising by pharmacists); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (striking regulation prohibiting organization with no pecuniary interest in controversy from hiring or compensating
lawyer).
74. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
75. The Supreme Court has concluded that the first amendment does not protect all speech.
See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (false advertising not protected); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
(obscenity not protected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words
not protected).
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ferred position. 7" This is particularly true when the speech occurs in an
appropriate public forum. 7
a.

Balancing Regulatory and Speech Interests in a Public Forum

Three categories of regulation affect the freedom to speak on public
property: 8 1) regulations in a traditional public forum; 2) regulations in a
state-opened forum; and 3) regulations in other public places. The Court
applies the highest level of scrutiny to regulations of speech in traditional
public forums. Accordingly, when a traditional public forum is affected, the
regulation of speech must further a compelling state interest and must be
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. If the regulation restricts only the time,
place, or manner of speech, however, and make no reference to the content
of that speech, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and must leave ample alternatives open to a speaker. A comparable level of protection is afforded speech in the second category of
regulation-regulation of areas opened by the state for use as forums for
expression." The third category consists of regulations of speech on public
76. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (balancing process should "keep
the freedoms of the First Amendment in a preferred position"); United States v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (recognizing that heightened scrutiny is appropriate when
reviewing the regulations which encroach upon freedoms recognized in the first ten amendments).
77. See generally Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (identifying the streets and parks
as traditional sites for public communication).
78. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). The Perry
Court refused to require a public school district to allow a rival union the same access to
teachers' mailboxes that was allowed to the union that had been elected the exclusive bargaining agent. Id. The Court stated:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply
circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks, . . . quintessential
public forums, [in which] the government may not prohibit all communicative activity.
For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave upon ample alternative channels of
communication.
A second category consists of public property which the state has opened for
use . . .as a place for expressive activity . . . . [The state] is bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.
Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by different standards. . . . In addition to time, place,
and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view.
Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
79. Id. These forums, however, are more closely controlled by the state that is not required
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property that is not traditionally classified as a public forum." This third
category of regulations receives the least scrutiny. The government may use
time, place, and manner regulations, as well as any additional restrictions
that ensure the forum will be reserved for its governmentally intended
purpose. 8 '
The concept of the public forum was first approved in the Hague decision. 2
Justice Roberts recognized the traditional dedication of the streets and parks
to public communication. 3 The Hague opinion, however, required that the
public right to speak be limited when doing so was necessary to advance
the "general comfort, and convenience," so long as the right is not denied
in the "guise of regulation."" This limitation substantially deferred to local
regulators the control over the level of effective access to public places.
In two handbilling regulation cases closely following Hague,85 the Court
formally denied state authority to foreclose the streets and parks to the public
for speech simply because the property belonged to the state.8 6 In Jamison
v. Texas,"7 a majority'of the Court invalidated an ordinance banning distribution of handbills on public streets and sidewalks. The Jamison Court cited
Hague as a direct rejection of state authority to absolutely prohibit speech
on public streets.88 In Schneider v. State, 9 the Court invalidated three
ordinances similar to the one in Jamison. The Schneider Court stated that
the government may not interfere with the freedom of an individual to speak
and distribute literature when that individual is rightfully on the street. 90
The Court concluded that "the streets are natural and proper places for
the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the
to keep them open indefinitely. Id.
80. Id. at 46.
81. Id.
82. 307 U.S. at 515-16.
83. Id.; see supra note 51 for the complete quotation.
84. 307 U.S. at 515-16. It is also noteworthy that Justice Roberts's recognition of a public
right of access to the streets and parks was based on the adverse possession property doctrine
developed at common law. He concluded that the public had a right to speak on the streets
and parks because the public, in a sense, owned those areas. See Stone, supra note 48, at
238. It was the state's property interest that had earlier led Justice Holmes to conclude that
the state could absolutely foreclose the use of the streets as a public forum. Id.
85. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
86. See Stone, supra note 48, at 239-44. Stone believes that the Schneider and Jamison
cases established definite post-Hague limits to a state's authority to control speech in public places.
87. 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
88. Id. at 415-16.
89. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
90. Id. at 160. The Schneider Court concluded that the state's interest in preventing litter
was insufficient to support a ban on distribution of literature to willing recipients. Id. at 162.
With regard to legislative choices, the Court stated:
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.
Id. at 161.
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exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place." 9' The Court thus firmly
established a high level of protection for public use of streets and parks
(traditional forums) for speech.
The Court appeared to break with the requirement that a public forum
must traditionally92 have been used for public speech in Grayned v. City
of Rockford." The Grayned Court considered an ordinance prohibiting
disruptive noise on grounds adjacent to a school in session." While the Court
upheld the ordinance because it applied only at narrowly defined places and
times," the Court limited governmental authority to restrict speech in a public
place. The correct inquiry, according to the Court, must take into account
"the nature of a place ... and whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time." ' 96 Nevertheless, this "compatibility with the forum" test did not ignore
the relevance of the forum's traditional use.97 Instead, it appeared to promise
that traditional public access would no longer be the exclusive test of an
established public forum.9"

91. Id. at 163. This statement from Schneider has sparked a great deal of discussion, especially
when considered in connection with the Court's recent emphasis on ample alternatives in cases
in which it has upheld speech restrictions. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). This approach would tend to indicate that the existence of alternative locations strengthens a state's authority to restrict speech in certain locations. See generally
Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place and Manner

Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 937, 967-68 (1983) (Schneider and later cases compatible only
if taken to mean a government restricting speech must provide alternatives, but existence of
alternatives alone not adequate reason to restrict speech); Stone, supra note 48, at 255-56 (restricting speaker to alternative forums is consistent with Schneider in the case of a speaker who
merely needs a place to speak, because his audience will follow).
92. The Hague Court had specifically noted that streets and parks had from "time out
of mind" been used for public speech. 307 U.S. at 515-16.
93. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
94. Id. at 106-08. The Grayned Court invalidated the city's anti-picketing ordinance challenged
in the same action. The Court found the ordinance that was identical to that invalidated in
a decision handed down earlier the same day, see Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972),
because it allowed a content-based exception-picketing was permitted only for those involved
in a labor dispute. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107.
95. The ordinance applied only to areas adjacent to the school and only when school was
in session. 408 U.S. at Ill.
96. Id.at 116.
97. The history of the place is relevant to evaluate the incompatibility of the speech and
the forum. See Stone, supra note 48, at 251-52.
98. Cf. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968). Although later overruled in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), Logan Valley illustrates the development of the Court's current
standards. Logan Valley rejected the application of a trespass law to demonstrators picketing
a store in a private shopping mall. The shopping mall was apparently sufficiently similar to
traditional public forums to warrant similar protection of communication. The Court concluded that "streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated
with the exercise of the First Amendment rights that access to them ... cannot constitutionally
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The Supreme Court recently clarified its position regarding public forum
property in Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local Educators'
Association.9 Justice White's majority opinion characterized the forums that
deserve the greatest protection as those that "by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate."' 0 Justice White concluded that heightened protection for public-forum speech is limited to those
locations which have traditionally been devoted to speech or which the government chooses to identify as a public forum. Thus, the "compatibility with
the forum" test is apparently an issue only when the government chooses
to establish a new area as a public forum.'0 '
The Perry Court clearly re-established that speech in traditional public
forums must be afforded generous protection.' 2 Justice White noted that
"in these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity."' 0 3 Although that statement is dictum, a majority
of the Court approved a constitutionally mandated minimum right of access
to traditional public forums for speech. Consequently, any future finding
that a location constitutes a public forum must result in the conclusion that
all communication cannot be prohibited in that location, and that time, place,
or manner restrictions must leave open effective, alternative methods of
04

communication. '
b.

Regulation of Speech on Public Property That Is Not a Traditional

Public Forum

Regulation of speech in areas not set aside as public forums by "tradition
or design" was the least scrutinized category of speech regulations recognized
be denied broadly and absolutely." 391 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added); accord Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981) ("consideration of a
forum's special attributes is relevant . . . since the significance of the governmental interest
must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved"). See generally Stone, supra note 48, at 251-52 (proposing that Grayned indicated an
expansion of the public forum concept).
99. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). If the Grayned decision implied that any public property with which
free expression was compatible constituted a public forum, the Court's recent decisions have
eliminated that possibility. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (public forums, identified as "places
which by long tradition or by government fiat .. .devoted to assembly and debate"); United
States Postal'Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 128 (1981) (requiring
"historical or constitutional support" to characterize a place as public forum); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (demonstration that similarity to streets and parks is not enough
where the forum is on private property).
100. 460 U.S. at 45.
101. The Perry Court used the term "character of the property," but apparently only as
an introduction for the three types of property used for speech and their respective levels of
constitutional protection. Id. at 44.
102. Id. at 45.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (rejecting
ordinance banning "for sale" signs in front of homes because available alternatives were too
costly or ineffective).
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by the Perry Court.'10 This category includes regulations of speech on
jailhouse grounds, 0 6 in front of a courthouse,' 7 and on military bases.' 0
Government regulation of this type of public property has been historically
more permissible than regulation in traditional public forums. Courts do not,
however, automatically uphold such restrictions on speech. They especially
reject those which are content-based.' 9
The Court also has rejected regulations that restrict speech by limiting
what normally would be considered a traditional public forum." 0 In United
States v. Grace,"' for example, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
statute interpreted to prohibit the display of signs or the distribution of
literature on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building." ' The
Court concluded that the sidewalks could not be distinguished from any others
in the city and therefore they constituted a public forum.' 3 The character
of the public forum could not be altered by "the [government] expedient
of including it within the statutory definition of what might be considered
a non-public forum parcel of property.""'
Although the Court rejected governmental authority to transform a public
forum into a non-public forum, the Court has permitted narrowing a public

105. 460 U.S. at 46.
106. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding trespass convictions of students
protesting on jailhouse grounds).
107. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Court broadly viewed the right of regulators
to restrict disruptive conduct even if associated with speech).
108. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding ban on political speeches on military
base); see also Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(upholding public school district rule restricting teacher mailbox use to union that was elected
teachers' exclusive bargaining agent); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (1976), prohibition of mailbox use
for unstamped literature). But see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (reversing convictions of students protesting racial discrimination policy by remaining peacefully in a public library).
109. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (invalidating school
policy prohibiting wearing of armbands in protest of Vietnam War while permitting the wearing of other symbols).
Content-based restrictions are not limited to viewpoint censorship, but can be based on official
censorship of an entire category of speech or an entire subject area. See Perry, 460 U.S. at
58-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530 (1980) (rejecting Public Service Commission's ban only on discussion of controversial
public issues in bill enclosures).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (1983) (invalidating governmental
prohibition of display of partisan flag or banner on sidewalks in front of United States Supreme
Court building); cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing convictions
of peaceful demonstrators on State House grounds). Note the corollary rule, however, that
permitting public access to an otherwise closed area does not necessarily create a public forum.
See Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (teachers'
mailboxes); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (military base).
11. 103 S.Ct. 1702 (1983).
112. Id.at 1706.
113. Id.at 1708.
114. Id.
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forum's availability by the use of neutral time, place, and manner regulations when particular circumstances create a need for such regulation.'' 6 In
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, '

6

the Court

upheld a Minnesota state fair rule prohibiting the distribution of handbills
or the solicitation of funds except from an assigned booth.'' 7 In lowering
the applicable level of scrutiny, the Heffron Court emphasized the temporary

nature of the fair and the large crowds expected, and concluded that these
circumstances sufficiently distinguished the fair from streets and parks. ' 8
The Court noted that the regulation satisfied the requirement of a reasonable

time, place, or manner restriction:''

9

It was content-neutral, served a signifi-

cant governmental interest, and left open ample alternative channels for
communication.' 20 The Court thus approved the regulation as a justifiable
restriction on speech in a forum that was distinguishable from streets and

parks.'
The particular need for regulation is also apparent when the state has
reserved property for uses other than communication.' 22 Speech is more likely
to be disruptive in such locations and, consequently, the Court may afford
greater weight to the local government's regulatory interests.' 3 The value
of the governmental interest thus becomes a more important factor in
evaluating the regulation.
C.

The Weight of the Competing Governmental Interests

When considering the constitutionality of speech regulations, the weight
that is given to governmental interests can never be considered independently
115. "If a statute is sufficiently narrow in scope, and applied without regard to content,
it can apply to remove certain public areas from the public forum." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,
& J. YOUNG, supra note 30, at 868; cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)
(upholding anti-noise ordinance on public property adjacent to school in session); Adderly v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding trespass convictions of demonstrators on county jail
grounds).
116. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
117. Id.at 633-34.
118. Id.at 651.
119. Id.at 654.
120. Id. at 647-48 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
121. Id. at 651. The Court has recently placed increasing emphasis on the existence of alternative forums when analyzing restrictions on speech. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 53 (noting
bulletin boards, meetings, and U.S. mail as alternatives to teachers' mailboxes).
122. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. The Perry Court discussed governmental reservation of an area
for other uses only in connection with regulations in a non-public forum. Id. The Court's
allowance, however, for time, place, and manner regulations in traditional public forums suggests that government may reserve even the most public of places for other uses as long as
it does not totally foreclose opportunities for speech in those places. Id.at 45. A determination
regarding public forum status thus effects not whether speech in a public area can be governmentally regulated, but how it may be regulated.
123. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding ban on political speech on
military base); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding state rule prohibiting press
from interviewing prison inmates).
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from the setting. That reservation aside, the level of scrutiny afforded various
24
speech regulations varies with the nature of the governmental interest.'
1. Regulation of Speech to Preserve Order
Every form of speech is not appropriate in every setting. A government
office building, for example, is not a public forum simply because it is public
property.' 2' Rather, there is a recognized governmental need to maintain order
on certain public property. The Supreme Court has thus approved restrictions on speech to preserve morale on a military base' 26 and to maintain
discipline in a prison.' 27 The Court has also deferred to legislative or
administrative judgment when confronted with a specialized setting' 8 or when
administrative judgments are directed toward the control of a governmentallyoperated commercial enterprise. '29
124. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 48, at 23-25. Professor Kalven notes that even Alexander
Meikeljohn, a great advocate of freedom of speech, recognized the need for restrictions to
maintain sufficient order for any group to accomplish its business. Id.
125. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 129 (1981) ("First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it
is owned . . . by the government").
126. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976) (upholding bans on partisan political
speeches and restrictions on leafletting on military base). But see Flower v. United States, 407
U.S. 197 (1972) (reversing conviction for distribution of leaflets on military base). There were,
however, factual differences between the two cases. The Flower Court noted that the street
involved was indistinguishable from a city street. Id. at 198. No such finding was made in
Greer. The Greer Court noted that the leaflet restriction prohibited only the distribution of
literature which "presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops." 424
U.S. at 831 n.2 (quoting Army Reg. 210-10, 5-5(c) (1970)). See generally Goldberger, Judicial
Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFFALo
L. REV. 175, 195-96 (1983) (discussing the factual distinctions between the Greer and Flower
decisions).
127. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding prison
bans targeted at meetings and large mailings by prisoners attempting to form a union); Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding prison rule prohibiting the press from interviewing prisoners). But see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (striking down official censorship of prisoners' mail because no clear standards used).
128. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114 (1981) (upholding federal statute reserving letter boxes exclusively for posted mail; noting
Congress' establishment of an elaborate regulatory scheme to control the postal system and
the need for nationwide uniformity for efficient operation); Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (emphasizing special importance of crowd control and safety in upholding restriction of handbilling and solicitation to assigned booths); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion) (plurality upheld city
ban on political advertising on transit cars emphasizing need to avoid "sticky administrative
problems"). See generally Goldberger, supra note 126. Goldberger noted that the lowest level
of scrutiny appears to be applied in cases in which "the administrator is an expert who is
regulating a closed institution with volatile or extremely complex administrative problems."
Id. at 203.
129. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
The Lehman plurality refused to require the city to accept political advertising as it did commercial advertising on its transit vehicles. The inappropriateness of transit vehicles as a public
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For example, in Perry'30 the Court upheld a school district rule allowing
one teachers' union access to teachers' mailboxes while refusing access to
another.' 3 ' The Court deferred to the administrative determination that the
exclusion was necessary to prevent a dispute between the unions in school.' 32
The school district was not required to produce any affirmative evidence
that the disruption they sought to prevent had occurred or was likely to
occur in the absence of the rule.' 33 Thus, the Court showed great deference
to regulations aimed at preventing disruption.
The Court, however, has not given such deferential treatment to regulations advancing speculative interests in more accessible public areas. For
example, the Court has invalidated an ordinance aimed at preventing fraud
that prohibited public distribution of leaflets not identifying the distributor.' 3
Similarly, the Court rejected a ban on handbilling and picketing in front
of the Supreme Court building which was intended to avoid the appearance
that the judiciary is influenced by "pressure groups."' 33 Thus, when the
forum in question is generally open to the public and the governmental
interest is speculative, the regulation is likely to be rejected.
This analysis, however, is applied only to those situations in which the
Court has not made a specific finding that the area in question is not a
public forum. If the location is a non-public forum, the governmental
authority need not demonstrate that the regulation effectively advances its

forum was noted: "Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or
other public thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in commerce." Id. at 303; see also
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (upholding
federal regulation protecting mail revenues); Goldberger, supra note 126, at 203 (noting Court's
deference to administrative judgments in closed institutions).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
131. 460 U.S. at 39-40, 55. The union permitted to use the mailboxes had been elected
the teachers' exclusive bargaining agent. Id. at 40.
132. Id. at 52. (quoting Haukvehahl v. School Dist. No. 108, No. 75C-3641 (N.D. Ill. May
14, 1976)).
133. The Perry Court stated:
There is no showing in the record of past disturbances stemming from PLEA's
past access to the internal mail system or evidence that future disturbances would
be likely. We have not required that such proof be present to justify the denial
of access to a nonpublic forum on grounds that the proposed use may disrupt the
property's intended function.
460 U.S. at 52 n.12.
134. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The Talley Court stated that "in the absence
of a more substantial showing as to Los Angeles' actual experience with the distribution of
obnoxious handbills . . . [there is insufficient] justification for the deterrent effect on free
speech which this all-embracing ordinance is likely to have." Id. at 66-67 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
(striking down ban on door-to-door solicitations by charitable organizations donating less than
75% of receipts to charitable purposes); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking
down ordinance prohibiting door-to-door handbill distribution to prevent fraud).
135. Unites States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (1983).
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asserted interest.' 36 Thus, when a non-public forum is involved, the speculative
nature of the governmental interest may not be fatal to the regulation.
Accordingly, the Court has upheld speech-restrictive regulations purportedly
aimed at preventing disturbances without any evidence that such disturbances
would result in the absence of the regulations.'"
2. Regulation of Speech to Protect the Audience from Offensive Sights
and Sounds
Among the most infrequently upheld governmental regulations on speech

are those which the Court views as attempts to protect audience sensibilities.' 38
When the governmental goal is to prevent annoyance, for example, the Court
requires that the audience be unable to avoid the annoying speech before
it will uphold a speech-restrictive regulation.' 39 This encompasses, but is not

limited to, the "captive audience" problem, and requires the balancing of
audience privacy interests against first amendment speech guarantees.'""
136. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 52 n.12.
137. See id. (upholding school district's rule limiting union access to internal mail system
to teachers' exclusive bargaining agent following determination that mail system was non-public
forum property); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
The Heffron case was an apparent rejection of public forum status for the Minnesota State
Fair. The Court noted that the comparison between the fair and public streets was "necessarily
inexact," id. at 651, but also emphasized that the regulation was merely a time, place, and
manner restriction rather than a ban on a particular mode of communication, id. at 655 n.16.
Thus, the Heffron Court's deference to the Minnesota rule (which prohibited the sale and distribution of materials except from an assigned booth) was not thoroughly explained. It could have
resulted either from a finding that the fair was not a public forum, or a finding that it was
a public forum, but that the regulation amounted to only a permissible time, place, or manner
restriction.
138. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating ordinance
prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from displaying movies containing nudity if screen visible
from street); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing offensive conduct conviction
of man in county courthouse wearing jacket with "fuck the draft" printed on the back); see
also Stone, supra note 48, at 263 (proposition that a distinction must be made between the
privacy interest in avoiding unwanted exposure to ideas, and avoiding an annoying mode of
speech).
139. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (noting that selective
restrictions in public places require that "the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the
unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)
(noting ability of others to avert their eyes from the offensive words printed on jacket).
140. For a thorough discussion of the captive audience problem, see Stone, supra note 48,
at 262-72. But see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding
addressee's right to compel distributor to remove name from distributor's mailing list because
addressee found mailed material offensive). See generally Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (refusing injunction against picketing in front of home because
it interfered with owner's right to privacy).
The captive audience problem as such is not applicable to most situations in which the government attempts to protect an entire community from offensive speech. In these cases, the government does not claim that citizens cannot avoid the offensive sights or sounds, but instead claims
that citizens should not have to avoid them, and that citizens should be allowed to establish
their own community standards. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between the
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The Court engaged in such balancing in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville4 when
it struck down an ordinance prohibiting the display of movies containing
nudity at drive-in theaters with screens visible from the street. The Erznoznik
Court noted that the Constitution prohibits the government from singling
out a particular type of speech for prohibition on the basis that it is offensive to an unwilling audience. "2 Although the Court in Erznoznik rejected
a total ban on an offensive form of speech,' 3 it concluded that time, place,
or manner restrictions on the offensive speech may be proper. 144
4
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim1
1 exemplifies the distinction between

time, place, or manner restrictions and a total ban. In Schad, the plurality
struck down an ordinance prohibiting live entertainment within Mt. Ephraim's
limits because the ordinance impermissibly banned an entire category of
speech.'46 The plurality carefully distinguished a previous case, Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc., "' 7 in which the Court had upheld a Detroit

zoning ordinance requiring adult theatres to be located at least 1,000 feet
apart. According to the Schad plurality, while a city can disperse the locations of an offensive form of speech, as Detroit had done in Young,"" a
city cannot institute a total ban on a form of speech as Mt. Ephraim had
attempted to do.1 9 Thus, the Schad decision firmly endorsed the Erznoznik
individual privacy interests implicated in captive audience problems and community standards
cases, see Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80
MICH. L. REv. 355, 456-68 (1982).
141. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
142. Id. at 209-10. One notable exception is Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974). The Lehman Court upheld a municipality's ban on political speech in its transit
vehicles while permitting the display of commercial ads. The Court noted the fact that the
audience was "captive" and that the municipality was involved in operating a commercial enterprise into which "sticky administrative problems" would be introduced if political speech were
permitted. Id. at 304.
The Lehman decision has been strongly criticized. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 48, at 275-80.
The Court itself has limited the scope of Lehman to its particular facts. For example, in his
dissenting opinion in Perry Justice Brennan notes and enumerates the many instances in which
the Court itself has limited the weight of the Lehman holding. 460 U.S. at 55 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Pacifica Court upheld
the FCC's plan to maintain a record of customer complaints to Pacifica's broadcast of a
comedian's "filthy words" monologue and review them when considering the renewal of Pacifica's
license. The Pacifica Court stressed that the invasion of audience privacy had occurred where
it is most protected-the listener's home. Id. at 748.
143. 422 U.S. at 209-10.
144. Id. at 209.
145. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
146. Id. at 65.
147. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
148. 452 U.S. at 71. The Court noted that the Detroit ordinance in Young had been supported by evidence of the detrimental effects of a concentration of adult bookstores in a
neighborhood. Id. at 71-72.
149. Id.; see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The Kovacs Court upheld a prohibition on sound trucks because the regulation prohibited only loud and raucous, not all sound
trucks. The Court stated that an "[aibsolute prohibition . . . of all sound amplification, even
[if7
reasonably regulatedin place, time, and volume... [would] probably [be] unconstitutional
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Court's conclusion that offensive forms of communication may not be totally
banned."'
Another important issue when regulators attempt to protect audience sensibilities is the availability of a less restrictive method of furthering the governmental goal.'"' The best recognized example of this "less restrictive means"
analysis is Martin v.City of Struthers."' In Martin, the Court struck down
a ban on door-to-door handbill distribution that was enacted, in part, to
prevent the annoyance of residents.' 3 The Court emphasized that the city

had ignored the less restrictive alternative of requiring residents who desire
not to be disturbed to post notices to that effect."' In striking a balance,
the Court recognized the need to place the burden on the unwilling recipient
to affirmatively avoid offensive speech.'

5

The less restrictive alternative is

not being utilized when a government prohibits a mode of communication
because it is offensive to the community as a whole.' 5 '
3.

Regulations Based on Aesthetic Interests

Many governmental authorities have prohibited modes of communication
in an attempt to eliminate aesthetically offensive conduct."' In Schneider
as an unreasonble interference with normal activities." Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).
150. But see Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
The Heffron Court upheld a ban on the circulation of handbills at the Minnesota State Fair.
The case is distinguishable, however, because the Minnesota rule did not prohibit all distribution of handbills at the fair, only those not distributed from an assigned booth. Id. at 643-44.
The Heffron Court also relied heavily on the specific forum at issue: the state fair was temporary and was located in a small area. The Heffron Court carefully distinguished the setting
from city streets. Id. at 651. The decision should not be viewed as having undercut the Court's
strict limitation on government bans of entire modes of speech in a public forum. See generally
Goldberger, supra note 126, at 179-82 (stating that the Heffron Court presumed the governmental interest was justified).
151. See Stone, supra note 48, at 264-65.
152. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Professor Stone uses the Martin decision in his study of the public
forum to illustrate the less restrictive means test. Stone, supra note 48, at 264-65.
153. 319 U.S, at 144. Many of the residents held night jobs and the ordinance was enacted,
at least in part, to prevent their being awakened by daytime visitors.
154. Id. at 147-48. Professor Stone notes that the Supreme Court chooses to place the burden
of avoiding the speech on the recipient because in doing so it may simultaneously protect the
rights of the speaker and his willing audience. Stone, supra note 48, at 264-65.
155. Stone, supra note 48, at 264-65.
156. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (loud and raucous soundtruck prohibition approved); see also Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic
Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1, 27 (1977) (suggesting that, in the case of aesthetic regulations,
there is no solution comparable to requiring the audience to avoid the speech, or requiring
the authorities to control a hostile audience.)
157. See, e.g., Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (ordinance banning off-site billboards); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ban on door-to-door solicitation
without residents' request); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance banning "loud
and raucous" loudspeakers); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (ordinance banning
loudspeaker use without license); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (ordinance prohibiting
handbilling to prevent litter).
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5 8 for example, the Court considered a ban on handbill distribution
v. State,"

aimed at the prevention of litter. 119 The Schneider Court noted that a less
restrictive alternative existed-a prohibition on littering itself-and consequently struck down the regulation. 60 The Court stated that the legislative

interest in aesthetics was insufficient to justify the restriction on first amendment rights.' 6 ' Clearly, the Court's early position when balancing aesthetic

rights reflected a hesitance to accept subjecinterests with first amendment
6
tive legislative preferences. 1
While aesthetic interests, as such, were acknowledged by the Court as early
as 1954,163 such interests have just recently been weighed directly against the

first amendment's protection of free speech.' In Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 16 a plurality of the Court accepted San Diego's desire for aesthetic
support the
improvement as a substantial governmental interest sufficient 6to
city's ban on off-site commercial billboard advertisements. 6 "[I]t is not

158. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
159. Id.at 162.
160. Id. at 162-63.
161. Id. at 161.
162. Id. But cf. St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 274
(1919) (upholding stringent requirements for billboards, but noting that aesthetic considerations
were only incidental).
163. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). The Berman Court authorized the
governmental taking of private property to avoid the development of slums. Id. at 31. The
Berman decision is well noted for its broad recognition of legislative authority to advance aesthetic

interests to promote the public welfare. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court
and stated:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Id. at 33 (citations omitted); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding
land use ordinance but noting no involvement of fundamental constitutional rights). See generally
Costonis, supra note 140, at 448-49 (suggesting Court is moving toward acceptance of resolutions prohibiting speech methods which are "associationally dissonant" with the forum); Williams,
supra note 156, at 25-28 (suggesting that the Court distinguish non-speech from impermissible
anti-speech regulations).
164. The zoning/land use cases, see supra note 163, did not involve a claim of first amendment infringement. Recent cases, however, have directly involved aesthetic and speech interests.
See, e.g., Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (aesthetic interests justify
a ban on commercial billboards); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (rejecting prohibition of live entertainment based in part on Borough's wish to avoid litter and traffic
congestion); Young v. American Mini-Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(approving zoning of adult theatres because failure to zone might impair the quality of urban
life). See generally Blumoff, supra note 71; Note, Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego: Constitutionality of Billboard Regulation, 69 CALIF. L. Rav. 1027 (1981).
165. 453. U.S. 490 (1981).

166. Id. at 512. The Metromedia Court was badly divided. There were a total of five separate
opinions. Justice White's plurality opinion struck down the statute because it made an exception for on-site commercial speech, but none for on-site non-commercial speech. Id. at 520-21.
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stevens, and Justice Rehnquist supported San Diego's authority
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speculative," the plurality concluded," to recognize that billboards by their
very nature, can be perceived an aesthetic harm.""'6 Yet, the plurality
recognized that because aesthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, they
must be "carefully scrutinized" to ensure that they conceal no impermissible
governmental purpose.' 68 Metromedia left open, however, the question of
whether an aesthetic goal would support a total ban on non-commercial
speech or a total ban on outdoor advertising,' 6 9 but did suggest that "constitutional problems [would be] created by a total prohibition of a particular
expressive forum."' 0 Metromedia thus established that aesthetic interests are
clearly legitimate goals, but they require careful scrutiny when weighed against
free speech interests because their subjective nature creates a high risk of
impermissible speech restrictions.
In Schad,'7 the Court considered a regulation creating a limited commercial
district that was justified in part by aesthetic concerns." 2 The borough of Mt.
Ephraim prohibited live entertainment within a specified district because it wished
to avoid the largely aesthetic problems that live entertainment was likely to
produce-litter, traffic, and a greater need for law enforcement.'7" The Court
rejected the prohibition and required the borough to demonstrate that its interests could not be served by means less restrictive of speech.' 4 According to
the Court, the borough had not left open adequate alternatives to this form
of speech.'" In effect, the Schad Court required the regulator to prove the exto totally ban billboards. Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 566 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Blackmun disapproved
even the prohibition on only commercial billboard advertisements. Id. at 525-26 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980) (discussion of the lower level of protection the first amendment affords commercial
speech).

167. 453 U.S. at 510.
168. Id. The plurality evaluated the importance that the city placed on the ordinance by
considering the exceptions it had created. The exception created for on-site commercial advertising indicated that the city considered such speech more worthy of protection than its own
aesthetic interest. The city's subsequent determination that on-site non-commercial speech did
not also outweigh the city's interest demonstrated an attempt to impermissibly re-order the
relative levels of constitutional protection given to commercial and non-commercial speech. Id.
at 520.
169. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20.
170. Id. The Court was referring to the decision in Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981), in which the Court rejected the city's prohibition of live entertainment to avoid parking
and litter problems. Accord Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
In Conrad, Chattanooga banned the presentation of the musical "Hair" in city owned theatres
because the municipal board determined it would offend many theater patrons. The Court struck
down the ban as an impermissible prior restraint. But see Young v. American Mini-Theatres
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinance prohibiting adult theatres from locating
within 1,000 feet of one another to prevent urban decay); Costonis, supra note 140, at 448-49
(suggesting that Metromedia did not foreclose the possibility that a billboard ban might be
constitutionally permissible for "associationally dissonant" reasons).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.

172. 452 U.S. at 72.
173. Id.at 73.
174. Id.at 74.
175. Id.at 75-76. Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, stated that the Court did not establish
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istence of adequate alternatives and establish that it used the narrowest restric-

tions available in banning an entire category of speech as offensive or
inconvenient.
4.

Incidental Restrictions of Speech

Incidental restrictions of speech are considered separately here because the
goal of the challenged regulations is to control particular conduct unrelated
to speech.' 7 6 The first amendment protects certain types of conduct as a
symbolic form of speech.'" When the government attempts to regulate the
conduct aspect of that speech, however, it necessarily affects an incidental
restriction on the speech.
The Supreme Court developed an analysis for incidental restrictions on
speech in United States v. O'Brien.7 In O'Brien, a draft resister challenged
his conviction under a federal statute that prohibited the destruction of draft
cards; O'Brien contended that the statute infringed upon his freedom of
speech.' 79 The O'Brien Court upheld the federal statute and O'Brien's conviction. In doing so, it established a four-part test for evaluating a regulation that governs conduct, but incidentally restricts speech." ' The regulation will stand if 1) the government had the authority to enact it, 2) the
interest served by the regulation is "important" or "substantial," 3) the
interest is not related to suppressing free expression, and 4) the "incidental
restriction" of speech is "no greater than is essential" to further that
interest. '
Nevertheless, the O'Brien test offers minimal protection to speech interests.
Although the O'Brien test sets forth a heightened level of scrutiny, the way

that the existence of adequate alternatives was a sufficient reason to justify a restriction of
speech. Id. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
176. This is the symbolic speech area of the first amendment, which is based on the presumption that the regulatory target is conduct-not speech. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,
& J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Part 3, sec. XIV, 988 (2d ed. 1983) (discussion of symbolic speech adjudication).
177. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking statute prohibiting display
of red flag); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (rejecting requirement that children salute flag in violation of their religious beliefs).
178. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
179. Id. at 377. The Court noted that a "sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms." Id. at 376.
180. Id. at 377.
181. Id. See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) (discussion of
the implications of the symbolic speech cases); Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct:
The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. I (discussion of the O'Brien case).
The O'Brien Court disallowed any inquiry into subjective legislative motives. 391 U.S. at
383. But see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983) (Court put heavy burden on state to justify tax which singled out eleven publishers);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam) (Court struck down State
statute which infringed upon a form of protected symbolic speech); see also Board of Educ.,
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in which it has been applied by the Court has resulted in only a rationalbasis level of scrutiny being applied to regulations.' 82 Only if the municipality
has restricted speech virtually without reason will a speech-restrictive regulation be invalidated. 83 The test's four parts are all directed at the governmental interest and allow no consideration of the extent of the restricti6n
on speech interests.' 8 Thus, the effect of employing the O'Brien test is to
divert the focus of review from first amendment protections. Notwithstand-

ing the focus of the O'Brien test on conduct rather than speech, the Vincent
majority identified the O'Brien test as applicable to Los Angeles' contentneutral restriction of speech.' 5
III.

THE VINCENT DECISION

The Los Angeles Municipal Code, section 28.04, prohibits the posting of
signs on public property.' 8 6 Roland Vincent, a candidate for city council,

Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982) (book removal
from school libraries presents constitutional issues worthy of adjudication); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Court put a heavy burden on school to justify its prohibition of black arm bands signifying opposition to the Viet Nam war, while allowing other types
of symbolic speech conduct).
Compare Ely, supra, with Content Distinction, supra note 55. The former, contrary to the
latter, suggests that the O'Brien analysis may be applicable to any first amendment restrictions
that are content-neutral.
For cases applying the O'Brien symbolic speech restriction analysis, see Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977) (concluding states cannot require motorist to display license plate bearing
message with which he disagrees); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam)
(reversing conviction under statute prohibiting "improper use" of flag); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969) (overturning conviction under ambiguous flag desecration statute).
182. See Ely, supra note 181, at 1484-85. Ely noted that the O'Brien requirement that the
speech restriction be no greater than essential, if weakly applied, would invalidate only those
regulations for which the municipality had an equally efficient alternative that was less restrictive of speech. Id. Ely notes that this test would "invalidate nothing." Id. at 1490.
183. See id. at 1486 n.18 (comparing the O'Brien test as vehicle for extending the same
deference afforded regulators of economic activities to regulators who restrict speech).
184. The lower scrutiny of the O'Brien test does not provide any real first amendment protections. The O'Brien test simply does not permit looking beyond the legislative purpose to
the regulation's affect on free speech interests. Consider Justice Harlan's reservation in his
O'Brien opinion, which noted that application of this test would be inappropriate:
In those rare instances when an "incidental" restriction upon expression, imposed
by a regulation which furthers an "important or substantial" governmental interest
and satisfies the Court's other criteria, in practice has the effect of entirely preventing a "speaker" from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate.
391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). The O'Brien test provides no mechanism for recognizing regulations which cut a speaker off from his audience.
185. 104 S. Ct. at 2129. The Vincent Court identified O'Brien as the appropriate test for
reviewing "a viewpoint neutral regulation of this kind." Id. (emphasis added).
186. See supra note 4 for the text of the ordinance. The city contended that the section
did not ban posting on all public property, but the Supreme Court interpreted it as a ban
of signs on public property. 104 S. Ct. at 2122.
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posted campaign signs on utility poles throughout the city. City employees
routinely removed Vincent's signs. 8 ' Taxpayers for Vincent (Taxpayers), an
organization supporting Vincent, filed suit in the United States District Court,
demanding damages and injunctive relief. Taxpayers claimed that the removal
of its campaign signs infringed upon its right of free speech.' 88
The district court granted Los Angeles' motion for summary judgment. 89
The court noted that the ordinance was enacted to promote appropriate land
9
use,' 9 ° and that posted signs in Los Angeles created a "visual blight."' '
The court thus concluded that the regulation was a reasonable and necessary
place and manner restriction, narrowly tailored to advance the city's
interests.' 92 The city's purported interests included promoting the safety of
workmen who must scale utility poles, eliminating traffic hazards, and
improving the appearance of the city.'" According to the court, the ordinance
did not regulate speech based on its content and did not affect speech in

an "open forum. 194
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court, stating that the ordinance was presumptively unconstitutional

as an abridgment of first amendment freedoms. The burden of rebutting
the unconstitutionality was placed on the city.' 95 The court found the aesthetic
interests advanced by the City of Los Angeles to be insubstantial because
the city had not sufficiently demonstrated the importance of its goal. 96 The

city did establish its interest in avoiding interference with the primary use
of public property,' 97 but failed to demonstrate that less restrictive solutions

187. 104 S. Ct. at 2122.
188. Id. at 2123.
189. Taxpayers for Vincent v. Members of the City Council, No. C79-0957 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
6, 1980).
190. Id. Finding 11.
191. Id. Finding 14; Conclusion 5.
192. Id. Conclusion 9.
193. Id. Conclusions 2, 4, and 5.
194. Id. Conclusions 8 and 12.
195. Taxpayers for Vincent v. Members of the City Council, 682 F.2d 847, 849-50 (9th Cir.
1982). The appellate court used the framework adopted in an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Rosen
v. Port of Oakland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981). Under the Rosen analysis, a state
or municipality must rebut a presumption that a statute or ordinance regulating first amendment rights is unconstitutional. The state or municipality must establish that the law has a
"substantial relationship" to a "weighty," not merely legitimate, government interest. The law
must also be the least drastic method of protecting that interest-extending no greater into
the realm of protected freedoms than is necessary or essential. Vincent, 682 F.2d at 849.
196. 682 F.2d at 851-52. The appellate court relied on Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Justice Brennan suggested
that a city could restrict speech in favor of aesthetic appearances only upon making a demonstration that the city was engaged in a comprehensive program of aesthetic and environmental
improvement. 453 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Vincent, the appellate court concluded that Los Angeles had failed to make a sufficient demonstration of involvement in an
aesthetic program. 682 F.2d at 852.
197. 682 F.2d at 852. The court rejected, in addition to the city's aesthetic goals, its interest
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were not available. ' The court concluded that, because first amendment
rights were involved, alternatives had to be tried, and shown to be ineffective, before the court could approve Los Angeles' total ban.' 99
In a six to three decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and upheld the Los Angeles ordinance.2"' Justice Stevens

delivered the majority opinion which emphasized the validity and substantiality of the city's aesthetic interest."' The Court first rejected Taxpayers'
overbreadth challenge to the ordinance,20 2 noting that to prevent the overbreadth doctrine from consuming general standing requirements, the doctrine must be confined to instances in which there is a significant risk to
first amendment protections. 03 The Court restated the substantiality requirement, and concluded that the ordinance did not present a risk of substantially inhibiting the protected speech of third parties not before the Court. 0
In fact, the Court noted, Taxpayers had failed to even identify these third
parties and their protected interests.20

5

Further, Taxpayers' political speech

was likely to receive as much protection as any third party's speech. Consequently, the Court chose to address Taxpayers' challenge to the ordinance
only as related to Taxpayers' own conduct.20 '
The Court next rejected Taxpayers' argument that utility poles should be

treated as a public forum because Taxpayers failed to demonstrate a traditional right of access to utility poles. This rejection of the public forum
in preventing traffic safety hazards as insufficiently established. Id.
198. Id. at 852-53. The court stated that the ordinance restricted speech in areas that had
traditionally been used for posting signs. The traditional use for posting signs, according to
the court, went a long way toward establishing that posting signs was not basically incompatible with the primary use of the property. 682 F.2d at 850-51 n.3. The court cited Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972), as authority for the "basic incompatibility"
test. 682 F.2d at 851 n.3.
199. 682 F.2d at 853. The court suggested a number of alternatives, such as size and design
restrictions or removal requirements. Id. at 852-53. The court noted that a requirement that
the city first try alternatives to its ban was particularly appropriate when, as here, the prohibition was obviously ineffective. The court quoted Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 155 (1981), regarding an
apparently ineffective federal prohibition on placing unstamped mail in homeowners' mailboxes:
I have the impression that the general public is at best only dimly aware of the
law and that numerous otherwise law-abiding citizens regularly violate it with
impunity. This impression supports the conclusion that the statute is indeed much
broader than necessary to serve its limited purpose.
682 F.2d at 853 n.6. The Ninth Circuit noted that in less than five months Los Angeles street
inspectors had removed 51,662 signs posted in violation of the ordinance. Id.
200. 104 S. Ct. at 2135-36.
201. Id.at 2129-30.
202. Id. at 2127.
203. Id.at 2126.
204. Id.The Court cited both New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982), and Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) for the limitation of the overbreadth doctrine to substantial
overbreadth, as measured by the reach of the regulation's deterrent effect on speech. 104 S.
Ct. at 2126.
205. 104 S. Ct. at 2127.
206. Id. at 2127-28.
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argument dropped the level of scrutiny to that used for speech regulation
in the third category of public property-property not traditionally reserved
as a forum.20 7 The Court reviewed the ordinance under the O'Brien fourpart test for analyzing regulations of conduct which incidentally restrict
speech.2"' The Vincent Court concluded that the prohibition was acceptable
as a content-neutral ordinance serving a legitimate governmental interest and
leaving available alternative methods of communication.0 9
Justice Brennan's. dissent, which was joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, 10 took issue with the Court's lenient approach to aesthetic regulation. The dissent considered the Court's approach particularly subjective and
susceptible to content-based applications.2" The dissent concluded that the
regulation was a prohibition of an important medium of communication,
which left available only unsatisfactory alternatives. 2" 2 According to the dissent, aesthetic interests warrant restrictions on speech only if the governmental authority is engaged in a comprehensive aesthetic program that
includes methods which do not restrict speech, and if the governmental
authority can demonstrate the substantiality of its aesthetic goals in an
objective manner.2"3
IV.

ANALYSIS OF VINCENT

The Vincent opinion reflects broad judicial deference to the judgment of
municipal officials* The decision misapplies first amendment precedent,
ignores the primacy of political speech, and waters down the definition of
"public forum." In addition, the Court's application of the O'Brien test
is misguided and neglects the availability of less restrictive means.
When it rejected Taxpayers' overbreadth challenge, the Court did not consider the broad applicability of the ordinance to any public property upon
which a sign might be posted.2"" By refusing to consider Taxpayers' overbreadth challenge because it had failed to present third party interests, the
Court decided that an overbreadth challenge only can be made by a party
207. Id. at 2134.
208. Id. at 2129.
209. Id. at 2134.
210. Id. at 2136.
211. Id. at 2136, 2138.
212. Id. at 2137, 2139.
213. Id. at 2141.
214. It is worth noting that the Court did not consider the interests of parties who might
choose other locations for their signs. The Court referred to the city's proscription of postings
at other locations, but dismissed the issue because it concluded that Taxpayers considered it
improper to post signs on sidewalks, crosswalks, curbs, lampposts, or safety equipment. Id.
at 2127 n.20 (citing Brief for Appellees at 22 n.16, Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellees]). Taxpayers' listing of sites upon which it did not contest the city's
prohibition did not approach those actually included in the ban, however. Brief for Appellees,
supra, at 22 n.16. The exclusion of this issue was significant because the Court's later rejection
of Taxpayers' argument that the signs were posted in a public forum was based solely on the
use of utility poles.
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whose speech is not well-protected by the first amendment. 2 5 The Court
apparently considered the loss of this facial overbreadth challenge to be unimportant to parties whose speech is protected because they have independent
standing to challenge the ordinance as applied to their own conduct. The
Court's reasoning, however, ignored another overbreadth argument by
dismissing the possibility that the ordinance swept too broadly because it
prohibited posting on all public property, including areas which might be
more appropriate for posting signs than the utility poles selected by Taxpayers. The Court reserved the related "least restrictive means" issue, but
nevertheless, the analysis was narrowed to the ordinance as applied to Taxpayers' conduct and the posting sites Taxpayers had chosen. 2 6
The Court next reviewed the scope of the ordinance as applied to Taxpayers. Valid regulations of speech must be content-neutral, both facially
and in effect. 2 ' The Vincent Court summarily concluded that the Los Angeles
ordinance was content-neutral because the regulation referred to no particular
viewpoint, but rather banned posting generally." 8 Yet, a facially neutral
ordinance that prohibits a relatively inexpensive, yet effective, form of speech
may place a disproportionately heavy burden on those who cannot afford
alternative methods. 2 9 The Court disposed of this argument in a footnote,
stating that the Court's solicitude for inexpensive forms of speech "has practical boundaries." 2 The Court failed to identify what special consideration,
if any, is appropriate when a prohibition threatens to eliminate an inexpensive mode of speech. Similarly, the Court failed to explain why the "practical boundaries" of that special consideration had been exceeded in this
215. The Vincent Court stated that "there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself
will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before
the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." 104 S. Ct. at 2126. The
Court went on to state that "Taxpayers ... have not attempted to demonstrate that the ordinance
applies to any conduct more likely to be protected by the First Amendment than their own
cross-arm signs." Id. at 2127. The result is that the party with the standing to complain that
an ordinance improperly restricts its own speech cannot make an overbreadth challenge.
216. Id. at 2128.
217. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
218. 104 S. Ct. at 2128. Justice Stevens noted that "there is not even a hint of bias or
censorship in the city's enactment or enforcement of this ordinance." Id.
219. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 48, at 30. Kalven notes: "We would do well to avoid
the occasion for any new epigrams about the majestic equality of the law prohibiting the rich
man, too, from distributing leaflets or picketing." Id.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, suggested that the related problem, a facially neutral prohibition, like the one at issue, might effect a ban on messages which consistently take the prohibited form. 104 S. Ct. at 2139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The ban, while facially neutral,
may greatly limit the political speech of local candidates typically carried by temporary signs.
Id. The same argument was also advanced by Taxpayers. Brief for Appellees, supra note 214,
at 20 (noting that an incumbent is "likely to find any opponent's sign offensive to the eye").
The Vincent Court did not address the issue, perhaps because it recognized that the ban would
limit equally the campaigns of incumbents and challengers.
See generally Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place,
and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 937, 959 (1983) (discussion of effects of time,
place, and manner regulations).
220. 104 S. Ct. at 2133 n.30.
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case. This foreclosure of perhaps the only effective access the poor have
to the public eye is particularly disturbing in Vincent because the Court was
dealing with political speech in the context of a political campaign-where
the first amendment has "its fullest and most urgent application." 22 ' If
solicitude for inexpensive forms of speech is unnecessary in this context,
there may well exist no circumstances in which solicitude would be required.
The Court left open the possibility, however, that solicitude was inappropriate only in the case before it. The Court noted the lack of evidence
that temporary signs were "uniquely valuable," and that Taxpayers' ability
to communicate was not generally threatened. Apparently, the Vincent Court
classified the signs as nuisances.22 Perhaps, then, inexpensive speech requires
no special protection when alternate methods of speech are available or when
the method of speech at issue can be considered a nuisance.
The Court thus limited its analysis by treating the ordinance as a contentneutral ban that reduced the total number of available forms of speech.223
The Court acknowledged the heightened protection accorded speech in a traditional public forum, 2 ' but concluded that the utility poles to which Taxpayers' signs were attached did not constitute such a public forum.22 In
light of Taxpayers' failure to demonstrate a traditional right of access to
utility poles, the Court briefly considered the character of the property, and
concluded that the mere fact that it is perhaps conducive to sign posting
"
does not mandate that the city permit such use. 22
' The Court thus denied
public forum status to utility poles because there was no traditional right
of access to utility poles, because the city had not determined that speech
on utility poles must be protected as in a public forum,227 and because the
city had not opened the forum for speech. 2 8 Consequently, the Vincent Court
categorized utility poles as public property meriting the least protection against
speech-restrictive regulations, and concluded that the city could permissibly
reserve property in this least protected category for its intended uses. "29

221. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
222. 104 S. Ct. at 2133, 2133 n.30 (noting that graffitti may be properly banned despite
absence of effective alternatives).
223. Id. at 2128.
224. Id. at 2133.
225. The Court concluded that Taxpayers had not demonstrated that utility poles had traditionally been recognized and used as a forum for speech. The Vincent Court stated that the
mere fact that they were public property was not enough to create a public forum. rd. at 2134.

226. Id.
227. The highly protected public forum areas are those which have been dedicated to public
speech "by long tradition or by government fiat." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
228. The fact that the city had not opened the property to speech foreclosed examination
of the regulation as one limiting speech in the second category of public property, property
the government has established as a forum. Id. at 45-46.
229. 104 S. Ct. at 2134; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (concluding that a government may
reserve non-public forum property for intended purposes, if restriction reasonable and not based
on speakers viewpoint).
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The Court's avoidance of a public forum analysis is particularly inappropriate in an analysis of an ordinance that prohibits the posting of signs
on any public property, including almost any conceivable public forum. '3"
The narrow focus on the utility poles themselves allowed the Court, by
applying the Perry categorizations, to eliminate all but the most minimal
scrutiny of the Los Angeles ordinance. The narrow focus also allowed the
Court to ignore the long tradition of posting temporary political signs in
highly visible public places"' because utility poles, a relatively recent
phenomena, historically were not the sites for such signs. 232 Thus, the Court's
narrow focus precluded any true scrutiny of a regulation that prohibits an
entire form of communication in public places. The utility poles on which
Taxpayers' signs were posted were located along city streets-recognized as
"quintessential public forums." 2'33 The Vincent Court, however, apparently
considered the poles sufficiently distinguishable from the streets on which
they were located to exclude them from that public forum.
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Grace, 3' a state can not
transform a public forum into non-public property by statutory phrasing.'
The Grace Court concluded that the statute impermissibly redefined "public
forum." The Vincent Court distinguished between utility poles and the streets
on which they stand. The redefinition which the Grace Court found inappropriate, however, distinguished between two otherwise identical city
sidewalks. The differing facts thus may allow one to reconcile the two cases,
but the Vincent Court made no attempt to explain its narrow focus. The
Vincent Court's distinction appears to be no more analytically supportable
than a conclusion that demonstrators' activities in a public park are fully
protected until they step on the grass, which is not a traditional public forum.
The Court noted that it was "of limited utility

. . .

to focus on whether

'
the tangible property itself should be deemed a public forum." 236
By this
language the Court implied that the result could be based alternatively on

230. Street and parks are the most recognized of traditional public forums. See, e.g., Perry,
460 U.S. at 45. Los Angeles' ban prohibits sign posting on sidewalks, crosswalks, curbs, curbstones, lampposts, street and traffic signs, electric light, power, telephone, and telegraph or
trolley poles which line the city's street. It also prohibits posting on the trees, shrubs, bridges
and drinking fountains commonly found in public parks. See Los ANGELES MUN. CODE § 28.04

(1981). The Los Angeles Police Department recognized the ban as a prohibition of any sign
posting on any public property. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 214, at 5.
231. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the historical role of outdoor posters and billboards); see also Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (discussing the traditional use of handbills).
232. The Vincent Court required Taxpayers to demonstrate a traditional access right to utility
poles "comparable to that recognized for streets and parks." 104 S. Ct. at 2134.
233. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
235. 103 S. Ct. at 1708.
236. 104 S. Ct. at 2134 n.32.
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a finding that the property is a public forum, but that the regulation constituted only a time, place, or manner restriction.237 Yet, the Court's reliance
on this implication assumes that an absolute prohibition of a communicative
medium could be acceptable as a time, place, or manner restriction-an
assumption not supported by earlier cases.23 The Court did not thoroughly
explain this alternative position, however, thereby possibly indicating an
intention to limit its narrow view of the disputed property (utility poles)
to the specific facts of Vincent.
The elimination of a public forum approach consequently shifted the focus
of the Court's analysis to a review of Los Angeles' interest in aesthetics
and of the regulation itself. The Court applied the test announced by the
Court in O'Brien.239 The O'Brien test was established to analyze regulations
which restrict the conduct aspect of symbolic speech.24 The test requires
that the regulation be within the government's authority, that the governmental interest be substantial or important, and that the governmental interest
be unconnected to the suppression of expression.2"' Also, the restriction of
speech must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."'2

The Vincent Court stated that the O'Brien test was the "appropriate
framework for reviewing a viewpoint neutral regulation of this kind." 2 3 Thus,
237. The Court stated that the identification of particular property as a public forum serves
as a "workable analytical tool," id., and noted that there is a gray area between the identification of property as a non-public forum and the permissible application of reasonable time,
place, and manner limits on a traditional public forum. Id.
238. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), the plurality noted that a flat ban on
loudspeakers would likely be unconstitutional. Id. at 81-82. The Erznoznik Court's conclusion,
however, may have been based on a finding that the government was censoring ideas, and
not just a mode of communication. The Court stated:
A state or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content....
But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the
public from some kinds of speech on the grounds that they are more offensive
than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power.
422 U.S. at 209 (citations omitted).
The Schad Court noted that earlier cases had not implied the existence of municipal authority
to prohibit an entire method of speech-live entertainment. 452 U.S. at 71. Similarly, the
Metromedia plurality implied that a total prohibition of a particular method of expression
presented Constitutional problems. See 453 U.S. at 515 n.20.
239. See supra text accompanying note 181.
240. 391 U.S. at 376. The O'Brien Court noted that its decision concerned regulation of
conduct which also contained an element of speech. Id.; see supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,supra note 30, at 989 (identifying the O'Brien test as applicable to analyzing restrictions of symbolic speech); Alfange,

Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (discussion of the O'Brien case). But see Ely, supra note 181, at 1484 (suggesting that the O'Brien
test is not limited to symbolic speech).
241. Ely, supra note 181, at 1484 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
242. Ely, supra note 181, at 1484.
243. 104 S. Ct. at 2129.
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the Court raised an important issue without clarification-the Court failed
to identify which attributes of the Los Angeles ordinance required the use
of the O'Brien test. If the Court was indicating its intention to apply the
deferential O'Brien test to any content-neutral regulation, the heightened protection of speech in traditional public forums likely will be eviscerated in
future decisions.24' The question of the Court's intention went unanswered,
however, as the Court proceeded to evaluate the ordinance under the O'Brien
test.
The Court showed a surprising deference to the City of Los Angeles by
accepting its professed aesthetic goals as being sufficient to outweigh Taxpayers' first amendment interests without carefully analyzing the city's
interests.24 The avoidance of visual clutter was a valid interest of the city"4 "
according to the Court, which also noted the district court's finding that
Taxpayers' signs contributed somewhat to the visual blight and "inevitably
would encourage greatly increased posting" by others.247
To establish the substantiality of the city's aesthetic interest under the
O'Brien analysis,24 8 the Court relied heavily on Metromedia, noting that
posted signs, like billboards, constitute a form of aesthetic harm.24 9
Metromedia and Vincent, however, are distinguishable. The Metromedia
plurality had identified billboards as large, permanent structures. 2 50 The
Vincent Court did not identify any similar traits in posted signs, which
generally are small and temporary. The Vincent majority also purported to
reaffirm the opinion of seven Justices in Metromedia that the prevention
of visual clutter was a sufficient municipal interest to support the city's prohibition of billboards.s ' Yet, Justice White's plurality opinion in Metromedia,

244. Because the O'Brien criteria focuses solely on the municipality's authority and interest,

the test offers no real consideration of the first amendment values at stake. See supra notes
181-82 and accompanying text; see also Ely, supra note 181, at 1487 (noting that any attempt
to broadly apply O'Brien to speech-restrictive regulations (such as the handbilling cases) "would
go a long way toward eviscerating the first amendment").
245. The Court did not clearly identify the city's interests. It noted that the city's interests
included both safety and aesthetic interests, 104 S. Ct. at 2127, but considered only the aesthetic
interests except for a brief reference to traffic control or safety, id. at 2135.
246. Id. at 2135-36.
247. Id. at 2123 n.6. The Court's acceptance of the municipal goal of preventing increased
sign posting is surprising because the Court noted its rejection of prophylactic prohibitions.
Id. at 2130.
248. The Court concluded that the city's regulation was within the municipality's authority,
and was not directed at the suppression of ideas. Id. at 2129. The focus was thus on the O'Brien
decision's requirements that the interest be a substantial one and that the restriction on speech
be "no greater than is essential" to its furtherance. Id. (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
249. 104 S. Ct. at 2131. The Court quoted the Metromedia plurality: "It is not speculative
to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed,
can be perceived as an 'aesthetic harm.' " 453 U.S. at 510. The Vincent court then concluded
that "the same is true of posted signs." 104 S. Ct. at 2131.
250. 453 U.S. at 502.
251. 104 S. Ct. at 2130.

19841

TAXPAYERS FOR VINCENT

in which three Justices joined, concluded only that the city's ban on commercial billboards, a less protected form of speech, was justified.2 2 In fact,
the Metromedia plurality implied that a ban on all outdoor advertising would
be constitutionally problematic as a ban on an entire expressive forum.253
Nevertheless, the Vincent Court went as far in approving Los Angeles'
restriction on political speech as the Metromedia plurality had gone in
approving San Diego's restriction on commercial speech. The Court examined
several decisions in which it had considered restrictions of offensive mediums
of speech,2" ' and concluded that the decisions established that municipalities
have a weighty interest in aesthetics sufficient to support a prohibition of
speech that is intrusive or unpleasant.2 " In none of the cited cases, however,
had the Court upheld a total ban on a form of expression.25 6 The Vincent
Court nonetheless concluded that an aesthetic concern constituted a legitimate'
and significant state interest for preventing aesthetically offensive speech;"'
the Court decided that that interest supported Los Angeles' total ban on
the posting of signs on public property.
The final O'Brien requirement is that the regulation prohibit no more

speech than is essential to the furtherance of the state's interest.23 8 In phras-

ing the issue, however, the Vincent Court asked whether the restriction was
"substantially broaderthan necessary." 259 Which of these two standards the
Court applied is unclear, but the phrasing suggested that the Court was
prepared to give broad deference to the city's aesthetic interest, even if it

unnecessarily restricted some speech.
The Vincent Court recognized that nuisances cannot be attacked through
prophylactic restrictions on speech, and took great care to distinguish the
252. 453 U.S. at 512. The Metromedia Court struck down the city's billboard restriction
because it exempted certain commercial billboards, but made no similar exception for noncommercial billboards. Id. at 514, 520-21; see also Blumoff, supra note 71, at 190 ("Seven
Justices agreed that San Diego could prohibit all off-site commercial signs.") (emphasis added).
253. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20; see also id. at 564. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the
plurality implied that municipalities may not totally prohibit signs); Blumoff, supra note 71,
at 189 (plurality suggests total prohibition impermissible).
254. 104 S. Ct. at 2129-30. The Court cited Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209-10, 209-10 n.5 (movies
containing nudity at drive-in theatres); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)
(political advertising on buses); and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (loud and raucous
loudspeakers). See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
255. 104 S. Ct. at 2130.
256. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), for example, the Court prohibited only "loud
and raucous" sound trucks and implied that a prohibition of all sound trucks would be
unconstitutional. Id. at 81-82. Similarly, the Erznoznik majority specifically rejected the claim
that a city could censor particular forms of speech as "offensive." 422 U.S. at 210.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the city banned political posters
only on a city transit system, not on all public property. Id. at 299-300; see also Perry, 460
U.S. at 60 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting several cases that have limited the scope of
Lehman); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (upholding zoning
regulation requiring adult theatres be 1,000 feet apart to 'preserve the quality of urban life').
257. 104 S. Ct. at 2130.
258. Id. at 2129.
259. Id. at 2130 (emphasis added).
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Schneider Court's conclusion that litter prevention was insufficient to justify
a flat ban on handbilling.26 ' In Schneider, the litter was potentially to be
created by the listeners, not the speaker, and the Schneider Court required
that the actual littering, not handbilling, be prohibited.26 ' In contrast, the
visual clutter Los Angeles sought to prevent was created by the speech itself.2"2
The distinction seems arbitrary, however, because the aesthetic problems
created by each are so similar, and the Court's suggested solution to the
littering problem in Schneider was unlikely to be successful.2"3
The Vincent Court was able to conclude that the ban restricted no more
speech than necessary by reasoning that Los Angeles' ban struck directly
at the aesthetic problem rather than at speech which created an aesthetic
problem merely as a by-product.26 ' Nonetheless, the fact that a ban strikes
directly at the source of an aesthetic problem does not demonstrate that
the ban restricts no more speech than is essential. The Court's analysis closely
parallels the requirement that restrictions of commercial speech directly
advance the governmental interest.2 ' Such a mode of analysis is inappropriate
when judging a restriction of all speech-both commercial and noncommercial-on posted signs.
Consideration of the Court's decision in Martin 66 demonstrates the flawed
logic of the Court's approach. In Martin, door-to-door handbill distribution
260. Id. at 2131-32.
261. Id.
262. The Vincent Court stated that "[I]n Schneider, an anti-littering statute could have
Here, the substantive
addressed the substantive evil without prohibiting expressive activity ....
evil-visual blight-is not merely a possible by-product of the activity, but is created by the
medium of expression itself." Id. The Court also implied that the handbill distributors in
Schneider were more protected because they directly confronted their audience. The Court noted
that a person "rightfully on a street . . . 'carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional
right to express his views in an orderly fashion.' " Id. at 2131 (quoting Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943)).
263. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 48, at 258. ("Indeed, an absolute ban on all public issue
billboards or signs for aesthetic or traffic safety reasons would be no more justifiable than
ah absolute ban on leafleting to prevent littering, . . . or an absolute ban on door-to-door
canvassing to prevent crime.") (citation omitted).
264. 104 S. Ct. at 2132.
265. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Central
Hudson Court stated:
In commercial speech cases . . . we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest.
Id. at 566 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981). The Metromedia Court noted that San Diego's prohibition of commercial billboards
must directly advance the city's aesthetic interests to satisfy the Central Hudson test for regulations which permissibly regulate commercial speech. Id. at 508.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
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was the precise source of annoyance to residents. 267 The city reacted by banning all such distribution. 2" Under the Vincent analysis, this ban would have
been constitutional because the ordinance struck directly at the source of
the problem.269 The Martin Court, however, noted a less restrictive alternative, rejected the ban, and required the city to ask irritated residents to
post notices expressing their preference to not be distrubed.270 The Vincent
Court avoided reaching a similar conclusion by dividing the issue: The Court
first concluded that Los Angeles' ban restricted only as much speech as
necessary, satisfying the last of the O'Brien requirements, 2 7 ' and then the
Court considered possible less restrictive alternatives as a separate, subordinate question.272
The Court took a negative view of Taxpayers' contention that less restrictive means were available to further the city's aesthetic interests. The Court
considered only possible exceptions to the ordinance and concluded that such
exceptions would not be constitutionally necessary and perhaps would be
unconstitutional in themselves.273 According to the Court, such exceptions
would be perhaps content-based, or would perhaps require the illogical finding that, for the exempted categories of speech, the city's aesthetic goals
were not jeopardized. 74
The fact that exceptions to Los Angeles' ban might be content based should
not dispose of the issue. In the past the Court has permitted content-based
regulations to stand so long as they were not viewpoint-discriminatory. 2"I
27 6
For example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
the Court upheld the FCC's
authority to use administrative sanctions against a broadcaster which aired
a sexually explicit monologue over the radio in mid-afternoon.277 The Pacifica
Court openly permitted the use of content-based sanctions. Application of
the Vincent analysis in Pacifica would have mandated that content-based

267. 319 U.S. at 144.
268. Id. at 142.
269. The Metromedia plurality noted the application of Burger's formulation that the test
should be in furtherance of a substantial government interest and essential neutrality to content. 453 U.S. at 517. The plurality concluded that Berger's approach would require reversal
of the Martin and Schneider decisions and that "democracy stands on a stronger footing against
legislative disruptions of First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 519.
270. 319 U.S. at 148.
271. 104 S. Ct. at 2132.
272. Id. at 2134-35.
273. Id.
274. The conclusion that exceptions would discredit the city's purported aesthetic interests
seems inconsistent with the Court's dismissal of the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the inapplicability of the ban to private property had discredited the city's position. Id. at 2132.
275. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (less protection for sexually
explicit speech); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (less protection
for theatres showing adult films); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)
(less protection for political speech on transit cars).
276. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
277. Id. at 730.
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sanctions not be considered. Similarly, in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Committee, 1 8 the Court decided that the Constitution compelled
an exemption to Ohio's campaign disclosure laws for the Socialist Workers
Party.1 79 The Brown Court could not have reached the decision that it did
had it avoided the risk of "engaging in constitutionally forbidden content
discrimination" as the Vincent Court had.2"' While the Vincent Court concluded that an exemption for political signs during compaigns would require
an illogical finding that the city's aesthetic interests were not jeopardized
by the exempted signs,28 that finding seems no more illogical than the conclusion of the Brown Court that people have a diminished interest in being
informed regarding the viewpoints of minor political parties.282
The Court's adherence to a broad content-neutral approach has perhaps
forced a choice between denying any first amendment protection to many
types of speech, and minimizing the level of protection that the first amendment affords.283 The Vincent Court's decision not to use content-based
exemptions risks giving very little protection to one of the most highly protected categories of speech-political speech during a campaign. The effect
of such a narrow analysis of alternative regulations is to favor a total,
unconditional ban on speech rather than a restriction drawn as narrowly
as possible. This preference for a flat ban, however, was specifically rejected
by the Metromedia plurality,28 which stated that the general prohibition,
not the exceptions, created the impermissible infringement upon speech.28
In Metromedia, Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger vehemently
criticized the plurality for reaching a decision that they believed favored a
broad rather than narrow restriction of speech.286 Yet both Justices effectively supported a broad restriction on speech in Vincent.287 While rejecting
the less restrictive alternatives suggested by Taxpayers, the Court failed to
require Los Angeles to demonstrate that its ordinance would in fact advance
its aesthetic interests. Instead, the Court merely noted that the district court's
finding included nothing upon which to base an assumption that the prohibition was ineffective. 8
278. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
279. Id. at 101-02.
280. 104 S. Ct. at 2135.
281. Id.
282. 459 U.S. 92-93.
283. See Stephan, supra note 15, at 213-14. Stephan notes that despite the Court's advocacy
of strict content neutrality, it has not adhered well to the rule. Id. at 205. Stephan states that
if the Court did follow so strict a rule, ignoring the categories of speech, it might be forced
to choose between "a more restricted concept of protected speech or a dilution of the level
of protection given to the most significant speech." Id. at 213-14.
284. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20 ("Despite Justice Stevens' insistence to the contrary, we do not
imply that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it 'does not abridge enough speech.'

285. Id. at 520.
286.
287.
288.
that its

See id. at 540-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens delivered the Vincent opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger joined.
104 S. Ct. at 2132. To the extent that Los Angeles was not required to demonstrate
ordinance advanced its aesthetic interest, the Court may have been relying on the district
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Next, when it considered whether the prohibition left open adequate alternative means of communication,289 the Court again relied on the district court
finding that ample alternatives did exist. 9 The Court reasoned that the
speaker's right to communicate by handbill distribution and direct speech
remained intact at the precise locations at which the signs had been posted.
Consequently, the Court decided that the ordinance complied with the
Schneider mandate that the right to speak not be abridged solely because
it might be exercised elsewhere. 9 As interpreted by later cases, however,
the Schneider mandate is not so simplistic: It requires not that the speaker
be allowed to stand without exception in a particular place, but that the
speaker not be prevented from reaching a particular audience. 92 It is
unreasonable to expect Taxpayers to reach its largely driving audience by
standing along the same well-traveled routes of Los Angeles attempting to
distribute handbills to drivers. 93 In fact, the majority recognized the advantages of posting signs on public property. "9 ' Nevertheless, the Court upheld
2 95
the ordinance based on the district court's findings.
Further, the Court failed to investigate fully the weight the city placed
upon its interest in aesthetics. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reliance
on Justice Brennan's Metromedia opinion, which required a comprehensive
aesthetic plan to support a municipality's restriction of speech. 96 Yet, The
Metromedia plurality also had examined San Diego's entire approach to
billboard regulation to ensure an objective determination of the weight which
' The Vincent majority, on
the city accorded to its aesthetic goals. 97
the contrary, made no similar objective investigation, but instead presumed the
substantiality of the city's aesthetic interest, and allowed aesthetics-a value
never mentioned in the Constitution-to outweigh the first amendment's protection of free speech.
court findings. In that case, the broad deference that the court gave to Los Angeles' speechrestrictive ban may be limited to the Vincent decision.
289. Id. at 2133. The "ample alternatives" inquiry was identified in Perry as a part of the
heightened scrutiny of time, place, or manner restrictions of speech in a public forum. 460
U.S. at 45; accord Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
655 (1981) (considering the existence of ample alternatives when time, place, or manner restrictions are used). This reversion to a public forum analysis was in apparent support of the Court's
earlier implication that the Vincent decision might alternatively be based on an analysis of
the ordinance as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction in a public forum. 104 S.
Ct. at 2134 n.32; see supra note 237 and accompanying text.
290. 104 S. Ct. at 2118.
291. Id. (citing Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163).
292. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
293. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 214, at 39-40 (noting that the person who can post
signs along the best-traveled highways will reach the widest audience); see also Stone, supra
note 48, at 257 (describing the popularity and effectiveness of posting signs).
294. 104 S. Ct. at 2133.
295. Id. Justice Brennan, however, criticized the Court for having failed to examine the
effectiveness of existing alternatives. Id. at 2137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
296. 1d. at 2130 n.25.
297. 453 U.S. at 520. There were four Justices, White, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, in
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Ultimately, the Vincent Court upheld a total ban on a particular medium
of expression-the temporary posting of signs on public property. The Los
Angeles' ordinance in Vincent is not limited to a temporary or sensitive area
as were the prohibitions in Heffron.290 Instead, the Los Angeles ordinance
applies broadly to all public property at all times. Although the Court could
have classified the particular form of speech as offensive, the Court instead
approved a complete prohibition of any speech, an approach rejected by
the Erznoznik209 and Schad 0 ° Courts. Los Angeles' complete prohibition was

supported only by a subjective municipal preference that was rejected as
insufficient by the Schneider Court."'
The prohibition effectively requires Taxpayers and other speakers seeking

a forum to rely on private property owners who, unlike Los Angeles, may
discriminate based on the content of the speech. The ability of private
property owners to discriminate limits the speech opportunities of those
expressing views that are contrary to the views of property owners, or that
are unpopular." 2 In short, the Court's analysis fails to protect a speaker's

right to reach an audience.
V.

REGULATION OF AESTHETICALLY UNPLEASANT
FORMS OF SPEECH AFTER

VINCENT

The Vincent Court limited the outlets available for the first amendment's
most protected category of speech to familiar, largely outdated, and increasingly ineffective methods of communication.3 "3 The Court did so by defining disputed public property narrowly and by requiring a demonstration of
traditional public access to that property. ' Proselytizing on a street corner
or distributing handbills no longer is an effective method of reaching an
audience, particularly if those with opposing viewpoints have sufficient
the plurality. Justice Brennan was joined in his concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun. Thus,
a total of six Justices made an independent evaluation of the city's aesthetic concerns, and
considered such an evaluation proper.
298. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 651 (temporary and crowded state fair); see also Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (military base).
299. 422 U.S. at 210; see supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. The large number of
signs removed from public fixtures by city works demonstrates the popularity of sign posting
there and the inconsistency of enforcement. Brief for Appellees, supra note 214, at 16-17 (noting
that 68,869 signs were illegally posted in fiscal year 1977).
300. 452 U.S. at 71-72; see also supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
301. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
302. 104 S. Ct. at 2137 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Talley v. California, 363 U.S.
60, 64-65 (1960) (establishing the need for anonymity especially when espousing unpopular
viewpoints).
303. The Court noted with approval its earlier decisions rejecting prohibitions on handbill
distribution, id. at 2131, and door-to-door distribution of literature, id. at 2133. See generally
Ely, supra note 181 at 1488-89 (predicting that the Court would continue to firmly protect
traditional and familiar methods of speech-"pamphlets, pickets, public speeches and rallies,"
while offering little or no protection to new or unorthodox methods of expression).
304. The Vincent Court focused on the utility poles on which Taxpayers' signs were posted
and required a demonstration of a traditional right of access to those poles. 104 S. Ct. at 2134.
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financial backing to use the mass media." 5 By permitting a flat ban on the
"nuisance" of posted signs, the Vincent Court closed one of the few
remaining effective, yet inexpensive, methods of speech simply because it
might be considered troublesome or ugly.3"6 A city apparently need not
demonstrate the weight of its aesthetic interest, as long as the district court
record is void of evidence reflecting that the regulation is ineffectual in achieving that goal.3"7
Vincent lowers the level of review for a broad speech restriction which
is based on purported aesthetic interests to that of a regulation which
incidentally restricts symbolic speech.3"' Moreover, when applying that
deferential standard, the Court's focus will be only on the ordinance and
the governmental interests supporting the ordinance. The ordinance must only
be viewpoint neutral and leave open other channels of communication. 0 9 This
focus effectively precludes judicial consideration of the relevant first amendment values.3" ' The Court's analysis, because it is focused entirely on the
regulation rather than the speech interests, allows a conclusion that even
severe restrictions of speech are permissible.
The Court also has demonstrated a willingness to focus on the specific
tangible property involved when determining whether public property warrants
"
' Such a focus on the specific property will reserve
public forum status. 31
the heightened protection accorded to speech in a public forum to methods
of communication that are familiar and generally less effective. 3 2 The Court
also has showed a willingness to accept content-neutral advancements of
municipal aesthetic goals, while turning a blind eye to the realistic difficulty
of effectively and inexpensively reaching a mobile audience.313 Thus, when

305: A speaker who is not well-financed simply cannot effectively reach a large audience.
The Court has refused to recognize any guaranteed right of access to the truly effective expressive
mediums. See, e.g., Stet v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (no minimum right
of access to television for editorials); see also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974) (no right of access or reply to privately owned newspapers); cf. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasters who present one viewpoint of
an issue must allow reply time to speakers with opposing viewpoints).
306. Justice Brennan criticized the Court for its deference to the city's aesthetic interests
without demanding that the city demonstrate all intention to implement a comprehensive aesthetic
plan not limited to speech-restrictive measures. 104 S. Ct. at 2141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan believed that the majority overlooked the significant risk that the city's purported
aesthetic interest was tailored to fit the already existing prohibition, rather than being the true
reason for the restriction. Id. at 2139-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
307. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2132.
308. Id. at 2129 (applying the O'Brien test); see also supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
309. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2134.
310. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
311. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2134; see also supra notes 226-28. See generally Perry, 460 U.S.
at 45-46 (establishing three types of public property and appropriate level of review for speech
restrictive regulations in each).
312. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
313. See id.
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the speech method employed can be deemed offensive, the Court has
demonstrated an intention to give local regulators broad deference to prohibit that method of speech in order to advance local aesthetic goals.3"" After
Vincent, apparently, only methods of speech that traditionally have been
recognized remain protected. 3 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

The City of Los Angeles banned the posting of signs on public property
to prevent a reputed eyesore, and received the emphatic approval of a
majority of the Supreme Court." 6 The Vincent decision inverted previously
recognized constitutional priorities. In effect, the decision thoroughly subordinated the concern for effective communicative outlets to undefined aesthetic
values. This subordination is particularly troublesome because the speech at
issue in Vincent was political campaign material, to which the first amendment has "its fullest and most urgent application." 3 '7
The Court's decision in Vincent demonstrates a surprising insensitivity to
the first amendment's protection of free speech in the face of subjective
aesthetic regulation. The Court's opinion contains a confusing application
of tests and uncertain conclusory judgments. The decision effectively charts
a new course in the review of aesthetic regulations of "annoying" speech,
without acknowledging the change in direction. After Vincent, the precedential
value of many previous cases is questionable, and the position of the first
amendment among the growing number of countervailing governmental
interests is uncertain.
Patricia Klein Smoots

314. 104 S. Ct. at 2130.
315. Id. at 2131 (Court indicating its approval of previously recognized heightened protection for handbilling on public streets).
316. Id. at 2130.
317. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).

